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This dissertation consists of three empirical essays that focus on economic development,
conflict, international trade, and growth. In regard to the first two chapters on economic
development, the data is taken from a developing country in which conflict and crime are
not necessarily explained by ethnic diversity, Colombia. On the other hand, the chapter on
trade and economic growth, it is used information from countries that signed a free trade
agreement (Canada, Mexico, and United States).
In the first chapter, we evaluate the impact of quality of education on violence and crime.
The paper exploits transfers of funds from the central government to municipalities for in-
vestments in education as a source of exogenous variation to identify the effect of education
quality. It finds improvements in education quality have a negative impact on economic
crimes such as rates of kidnapping and theft, as well as the presence of illegal armed groups.
These findings are consistent with an opportunity cost effect of education, in which high
quality education increases expectations of being absorbed by the labor market and discour-
ages engagement in criminal activities. Results also point to a pacifying effect of education
such that improvements in education quality generate less violent environments, and promote
social and political stability. The results are robust to a number of econometric concerns
and different measures of quality of education.
vi
The paper in second chapter explores geographical roots of inequality and conflict. It empir-
ically establishes that land inequality and conflict can be explained by ecological diversity.
We exploit the differences in ecological diversity of non-immediate neighbors as an exoge-
nous variation to identify the impact of ecological diversity on both inequality and conflict.
We use results in elections at municipality level as a potential transmission mechanism that
explains the results. Municipalities with higher ecological diversity exhibit more land in-
equality and higher probability of having conflict. In areas where the political advocates to
reduce inequality tends to obtain more votes than its contender.
In the last chapter, we explore empirically the causal link between international trade and
economic growth within a free trade area. In particular, we use data from the North Amer-
ican Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) region to estimate the causal relationship between
economic growth and trade flows, but isolating trade within the bloc from trade with the
rest of the world. We treat the three countries as a block and follow the identification strat-
egy proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995). The period considered is 1960-2014. We do
not find conclusive evidence that supports the idea that trade within a trade bloc is more
important for growth than trade with the rest of the world.
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Chapter 1
THE EFFECT OF QUALITY OF EDUCATION ON CRIME: EVIDENCE FROM
COLOMBIA1
1.1. Introduction
The World Health Organization (WHO) reports suggest that 500,000 people are murdered
around the world (World Health Organization, 2014). Besides homicides, men and women
are exposed to violence in some form or the other, be at home, school, or on the streets, given
its prevalence worldwide. As per the WHO, violence is preventable and its impact may be
reduced but the efforts made have not been enough to tackle it in an effective way. Krug et al.
(2002) asserts that this might be the result of an absence of sound decision-making, reduced
feasibility of policy options, or lack of determination. Besides its causes, since violence is
considered as a form of crime, the actions to address mainly involve investing in more police
and army.
In 1996, the World Health Organization declared violence “...as a major and growing
public health problem across the world” Krug et al. (2002, pp. XIX). Treating violence as
a public health problem instead may help in addressing the problem through investment
in other kinds of policy interventions, such as better education systems and socio-economic
conditions. As such, education policy may be a tool that countries use not only to contribute
to the development of human capital but to also reduce violence and its impacts.
Education may affect violence through different channels. First, education may increase
expectations of being absorbed in the labor market and of future returns, discouraging
engaging in criminal activities. This is what it is called the ‘opportunity cost effect’ of
education. Second, investments in education may generate environments that are less violent,
1With Manini Ojha (Southern Methodist University).
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as well as promote social and political stability. It is a way in which the government may
positively affect social development. In this sense, education may have what we refer to as a
‘pacifying effect’. Third, education may even be used as a means of indoctrination of ideas
in regions with a strong presence of politics or religion. Strong ideological differences on
account of political ideas could plausibly be fueled by education and lead to conflict between
parties as well as against the government machinery. We call this the ‘indoctrination effect’.
As a fourth channel, improvements in quality of education will likely impact enrollment and
years of education as well in a country over time, which in turn has a direct impact on
violence levels.2
The relationship between education and violence has garnered significant interest from
researchers and policy-makers over the last few decades. In general, a violent environment
is found to hurt economic development in the long run and affect human capital investment
decisions of households (Rodŕıguez et al., 2009). Determining optimal public and private
policies required to combat violence, specifically crime, are thus of utmost importance in
such environments (Becker, 1968). Apart from greater expenditure on defense, police, and
an efficient judicial system, research suggests that these policies could also be extended to
include expenditure on areas that generate better socio-economic conditions. Improving
local educational systems is a primary way to achieve this goal (Lochner, 2004, 2010a,b).
Extant literature in this field focuses on the relationship between violence and quantity
of education measured by educational enrollment or attainment. Much less is known about
the impact of quality of education on violence. Recent debates however emphasize the
importance of looking at education quality rather than quantity as a reliable indicator of
economic impacts for a country. The number of years a student stays in school may not be
an adequate measure of a good education system or even student achievement. Measures of
individual cognitive skills that incorporate dimensions of test-score performance are found
to provide better indicators of economic outcomes (Hanushek, 2005; Hanushek et al., 2016;
2In this paper we do not explore neither the indoctrination effect nor the fourth channel. For discussion on
school quality and school choice impacting educational attainment and in turn crime, see Lochner (2010b).
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Hanushek et al., 2017).
In line with this, we assert that assessing the impact of education quality is essential for
researchers to understand the existence and persistence of violence and conflicts. Moreover,
from a policy perspective, investment in better quality education may be a tool of social
mobility and long run development for the country. When students learn more in school,
they become more skilled and effective participants in the country’s workforce. Over the
long run, successful efforts to improve school quality would thus imply an extraordinary rate
of return. Thus, quantity of education without quality may not matter.
This paper therefore attempts to analyze the causal impact of quality of education on
violence, specifically on different types of violent crimes and on presence of conflict. One
limitation of the literature that tries to evaluate the impact of education on crime and
conflict is the lack of an identification strategy that overcomes the traditional endogeneity
problem (Barakat and Urdal, 2009; Collier et al., 2004; Hegre et al., 2009; Melander, 2005;
Shayo, 2007). Moreover, the existing papers are cross country analyses which increases the
probability of having omitted variable bias as the data and institutions across countries are
less comparable at aggregate levels. Our paper on the other hand, addresses the endogeneity
issues and exploits geographic and time variation at a disaggregated level to study this
relationship.
We examine the ‘opportunity cost’ and the ‘pacifying’ effects using Colombia as a case
study.3 Our empirical analysis is at the municipality level and spans a period of six years
from 2007-2013. We use results from a mandatory standardized examination for students at
the last level of high school as the measure of quality of education. Test scores as a measure
of quality are associated with selection issues as they are conditional on taking the exam.
Therefore, we correct for the self - selection problem in test scores to minimize measurement
error in our estimates.
3Although religion is an important aspect of Colombian society, given its hispanic roots, it is not con-
sidered as a country in which religion may be used as a way of indoctrinating people. In fact, the religious
education may be a root of social cohesion and stability, though we do not explore this channel in the paper.
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We follow an instrumental variable approach for our estimation since education quality is
endogenous. Quality of education is dependent on funds allocated by the central government
for education to each municipality. However, this allocation is likely endogenous as well given
that there are unobservables associated with the process of allocation of funds that could
be correlated with violence in municipalities. We construct two instruments to address this
endogeneity problem. The first instrument is a spatial instrument constructed by taking
spatially lagged transfers of funds from the center to the municipalities. More specifically,
it is based on central government transfers to neighboring municipalities for investment in
quality of education. The second instrument is based on a shift-share approach which exploits
variation in the size of the central budget, but is not a function of current allocation decisions.
We take the investment in education quality by the central government in municipalities in
the year 2001 as fixed and multiply that with yearly total central government budget for 2007
to 2012 to arrive at the investment figures.4 We use one period lag of both our instruments
for quality recognizing that investment in education may have a lag effect. Both instruments
are in per capita terms.
Our main findings show that quality of education has a significant and negative impact
on crime at an aggregate level, as well as on more disaggregated measures of crime such
as property crime and violent crimes. More specifically, these include crimes like car theft,
total kidnappings and non-political kidnappings. We categorize all types of thefts as crimes
on property (or property crimes) and the results point towards an opportunity cost effect of
education quality.
On the other hand, violent crimes include kidnappings and homicides. Our results are
perhaps suggestive of a pacifying effect of better education quality in this case. Finally,
we analyze the impact education quality has on the presence of illegal armed groups in
municipalities as additional outcome. Better quality of education in municipalities is found
to reduce the probability of presence of such groups This corroborates our results suggesting
4The year 2001 for investment allocation decision was considered due to data limitations. This is the only
year for which central government investment data was available before our period of analysis.
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a pacifying effect of better education quality as it points to a general state of peace and
stability. The results are robust to sample restrictions like exclusion of state capitals or
municipalities with less than 200,000 population as well as urban areas.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents a review of related
literature on education and violence which is followed by a brief background on violence in
Colombia in section 1.3. Section 1.4 consists of five subsections. Subsection 1.4.1 describes
how we construct our data followed by subsection 1.4.2 describing selection issues and sub-
section 1.4.3 describing our estimation strategy. Subsection 1.4.4 gives a detailed account of
our identification strategy and subsection 1.4.5 provides the institutional framework for cen-
tral government allocation of funds in Colombia. Section 1.5 discusses the baseline results
followed by robustness checks in section 1.7. The paper ends with conclusion and policy
discussion in Section 1.8.
1.2. Literature
Considerable macro-level and cross-national studies exploring the correlation between the
levels of education and conflict find that countries with higher average levels of education
have a lower risk of experiencing conflict. Most of the evidence focuses on education levels
measured by some variant of secondary education enrollment or years of education. In
particular, it is found that young male population are more likely to increase the risk of
conflict in societies where secondary education is low, especially in low and middle income
countries. Increasing secondary male enrollment and average schooling of population thus
reduces risk of civil war and conflict (Collier et al., 2004; Melander, 2005; Shayo, 2007;
Barakat and Urdal, 2009; Hegre et al., 2009).
Single country papers studying the causal impacts of education levels on terrorism, re-
ligious and ethno-communal violence find ambiguous results. Urdal (2008) suggests that
literacy has no causal impact on armed conflict risk and a slightly positive effect on polit-
ical violence. Mancini (2005) finds that on average, inter-ethnic educational inequality is
generally lower in peaceful districts for Indonesia. Krueger and Malečková (2003) present
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that terrorists have slightly better average education than the population in general in Gaza.
Other papers exploring the relation between quantity of education and violence for single
countries are Berrebi (2007), Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) and Oyefusi (2008) but these
papers report correlations. Buonanno and Leonida (2009) find a negative impact of edu-
cation on crime using a set of region fixed effect, year fixed effects and region-specific time
trends together with an extensive set of variables, trying to address the endogeneity problem
the relationship between education and crime intrinsically has.
Another strand of literature focuses on educational policies and violence. Brown (2011)
in his theoretical paper examines the ways in which education policies impact dynamics of
violent conflict. Moretti (2005) argues that the reductions in violence and property crime
are caused by increased schooling although education increases the returns to white collar
crime more than the returns to work. Lochner (2004) finds that arrest rates for white
collar crimes increase when education levels rise. Rodŕıguez et al. (2009) explores in-prison
behavior in Argentina to asses the effect of educational programs on violence and finds that
such programs significantly reduce property damages in prison.
Lochner (2010b) in his review of empirical work recognizes that both school quality and
the type of school students attend are important for determining the impacts of quantity
of education on crime. However, there are no studies estimating a direct impact of school
quality on crime. Some causal papers investigate the impact of school choice on student
outcomes including delinquency and crime Cullen et al. (2006), Deming (2011), Guryan
(2004). These point to the fact that school quality has an impact on enrollment and through
this channel, reduces crime.
Lastly, some papers investigate the reverse relationship, that is, the causal effect of vio-
lence on education and labor market outcomes. Rodŕıguez and Sanchez (2012) estimate the
causal effect of armed conflict exposure on school drop-outs and labor decisions of Colom-
bian children and find that conflict affects children older than 11, inducing them to drop
out of school and enter the labor market too early. Barrera and Ibáñez (2004) develop a
dynamic theoretical model on the relationship between violence and education investments.
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They identify that violence affects utility of households directly, modifies consumption of
education, rates of return of education and thus changes investment in education.
1.3. Background
The relationship between education and violence is of special interest in Colombia since it
has suffered a long standing conflict. Following the assassination of the presidential candidate
in 1948, Colombia was engulfed in violent civil war known as La Violencia. Civil conflict
among the main political parties in rural areas eventually ended with a political agreement
known as Frente Nacional under which the two parties agreed to alternate power as a sign
of peace. Interpreted as a discriminatory policy by some factions of the liberal party, this
motivated the creation of two left wing guerrillas - FARC and ELN - that are still active
today. The 1970s marked the onset of the drug phenomena that resulted in acute violence
across the country and extended to the urban areas as well. According to the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Colombia was one of the most violent countries in the
1990s measured by homicide rates. Although the homicide rates have decreased significantly,
it remains a country with severe levels of violence even today.
1.4. Data and Identification
1.4.1. Data
Our data for this analysis is taken from four different sources. First, we use municipality
level panel data constructed by the Studies Center of Economic Development (CEDE by its
acronym in Spanish). The panel contains information on 1122 municipalities and around
2000 variables from the last two decades. It consists of 5 sub-panels: general characteristics,
land and agriculture, fiscal policy, conflict and violence and education.5 Second, we use the
Colombian Institute for Evaluation of Education (acronym ICFES in Spanish) database for
test scores at individual level within the municipalities. Third, we use the census information
5The CEDE collects information from different public and private institutions and is publicly available.
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from the National Administrative Department of Statistics (acronym DANE in Spanish) ad-
ministered by Minnesota Population Center, University of Minnesota, IPUMS International
(Minnesota Population Center, 2015). The IPUMS sample contains information for approx-
imately 4 million individuals and the census was conducted between May 2005 to February
2006. Fourth, we use data from the National Planning Department (DNP) for information
on investment in educational quality. Our final constructed data is at municipality level and
spans the years 2007 to 2013.
Our main outcome variables are different forms of crime in a particular municipality at a
given point in time. These are homicides, kidnappings, and thefts. Theft is further divided
between theft on persons, car theft, commerce theft and household theft. Kidnapping is
segregated between total, political and non-political kidnappings. Homicides are defined as
the number of people killed. Kidnapping is defined as the abduction or illegal transportation
of a person, and political kidnapping is a kidnapping committed by an illegal armed group.6
For ease of understanding and analysis, we first generate a measure of intensity of crime
which is the sum of all crime rates. We then group our crime measure into two categories -
property crimes and violent crimes. We construct a measure of intensity of property crimes
which includes different theft rates. Similarly, we create a measure of intensity of violent
crimes which includes non-political, and political kidnappings, and homicides. We also use
all disaggregated rates of crime discussed above as our outcome variables. Crime rate is
total crime divided by total population times 100,000 inhabitants respectively for the entire
analysis.
Another outcome of interest in our paper is the presence of illegal armed groups in a
municipality at a given point in time. Presence of illegal armed groups is a dummy variable
which takes the value 1 if either FARC, ELN or both are present in the municipality. This
outcome is of special interest because they suggest the impact of education quality on violence
associated solely with conflict in Colombia.
6Political kidnapping is perpetrated by guerrillas and para-militaries and non-political kidnapping is
perpetrated by common delinquencies, narco-traffickers and others.
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Our main variable of interest is quality of education at municipality level for which we
consider student test scores at a standardized examination at their last level of high school.
ICFES provides individual standardized test scores for mathematics, language, social sci-
ences, philosophy, biology, chemistry, and physics. We construct a municipality level mea-
sure of test scores that accounts for selection into the examination. Our preferred measure
of quality is an average of the selection-corrected median scores in the subjects combined.
We also consider test scores in only mathematics and language to ascertain performance
in terms of cognitive ability, as well as social sciences and philosophy to examine perfor-
mance in the social area. These measures are an average of the selection-corrected median
scores in mathematics and language; and social sciences and philosophy, respectively. Ad-
ditional measures of quality are explored in this paper such as average z-score index of the
selection-corrected median in seven subjects, average individual total score, median score in
mathematics, median score in language, median score in social sciences, and median score
in philosophy, separately.
Our control variables include a linear time trend, demographic and economic municipality
level controls like total population, birth rate, infant mortality rate, a rurality index of
municipality as an indicator of inequality and development, and agricultural yield7; projected
population to attend primary and secondary school, as measures of quantity of education
or enrollment; and fiscal characteristics like per-capita municipality expenditures and tax
revenue as measures of economic growth. Table A.1 summarizes the variables used in our
analysis.8
7Agricultural yield is the ratio of agricultural cultivation to agricultural production for all crops at mu-
nicipality level.
8General characteristics of municipality (notaries, banks, churches, health centers, clinics, tax collection
offices, electricity coverage), historical characteristics (history of violence, Spanish occupation of municipality,
presence of indigenous population, presence of land conflict, presence of illegal crops, armed groups) and
geographical characteristics (area of municipality in squared km., height of municipality in squared km.,
linear distance to state capital in squared km) distribution of land and land owners in municipality are not
included as we estimate a fixed effects model and these are time invariant characteristics of the municipalities.
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For illustration purposes, Figures (A.1)-(A.4) shows the distribution of crime rate9 and
the average score in subjects across the country in 2007 and 2013. The correlation between
crime rate and the average score in subjects is 0.2359 in 2007 and 0.2360 in 2013. The initial
positive correlation apparent from the figure is intriguing and speaks to the importance of
analyzing the causal link between quality of education and violence in Colombia further.
1.4.2. Selection Issues
A potential issue with using test scores as a measure of education quality is that test
scores suffer from self-selection issues. Since the test scores are conditional on going to school
till grade 11 and taking the standardized exam, they do not represent the true quality of
education in the municipality and would lead to measurement error in our estimates. We
correct this self-selection issue by using data from the 2005 IPUMS Census and estimate the
drop out rates at municipality level to minimize the measurement error. All municipalities of
a state are not included in the IPUMS Census sample. IPUMS aggregates the municipalities
with population less than 20,000 into one category for every state. To arrive at the final
municipality level dropout rates, we make two assumptions. First, we assume that the
dropout rate for each municipality that falls under the aggregated category of IPUMS is
same. We believe this is a valid assumption since these are smaller municipalities and are
similar in population characteristics to each other. Second, municipality level drop out rates
do not change significantly across time.
To estimate the drop out rates, we use probability weights provided in the census data and
calculate the total population in each state in 2005 for the age category of 16-18 years. This
is the age group at which most students take the examination in high school in Colombia.10
We then calculate the population of 16-18 year olds who never attended school, were not
attending school in 2005 or had studied up to middle school but did not complete schooling
in 2005. This depicts the total number of dropouts for each municipality. Dividing the
9We measure crime rate as the sum of the individual crime rates included in the analysis.
10ICFES data shows that approximately 77% of the population that took this examination belonged to
this age category in 2007.
10
total dropouts by the total population in this age group for each municipality gives us the
weighted drop out rates for 2005.
Using individual level test scores from ICFES, we arrive at the median score at munic-
ipality level. Our aim is to impute the dropouts as those scoring below this median score.
We impute zeros for those students who belong to the dropout category and then take the
median score for each municipality since the zero is irrelevant as long as dropouts are below
the median. The assumption for this imputation is that those students who did not appear
for the exam or dropped out are considered to be students who would have scored below the
median. This brings us to the selection-corrected median test scores which is our measure
of education quality at the municipality level.11
1.4.3. Estimation
We estimate the following model to identify the causal impact of quality of education on
violence and crime measures
Ymt = β0 + β1EducationQualitymt + β2Xmt + µm + trendt + εmt (1.1)
where Ymt is first taken as the index of crimes in municipality m at time period t, which is
the sum of all individual crimes, then as the index of only property crimes, and finally as
the index of only violent crimes in municipality m at time period t. This is followed by a
disaggregated analysis where eight separate rates of crime are taken in municipality m at
time period t; EducationQuality is municipality level measure of test scores explained in the
previous section; Xmt are the set of covariates; µm are the municipality fixed effects; trendt
captures time trend of the outcome variable and εmt the mean zero error term in equation.
Education quality is instrumented by two instruments given the existing endogeneity issues.
The instruments are discussed in the next subsection. The parameter of interest is β1 giving
11Note that in the database, there are some missing values for the municipality of residence. We impute
the municipality of residence with the municipality where the students took the examination. For 2007 there
were 198, 2008: 207, 2009: 223, 2010: 535, 2011: 1171, 2012: 95 missing values in ICFES database.
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us the causal impact of education quality on violence. We also estimate another model to
identify the causal impact of quality of education on presence of illegal armed groups
Presencemt = β0 + βp,1EducationQualitymt + β2Xmt + µm + trendt + εmt (1.2)
where the outcome variable Presencemt = 1 if any of the illegal armed groups (ELN or
FARC) is present in municipality m at time t. We also decompose this outcome variable
and estimate the model separately for presence of FARC and presence of ELN. Equation
1.2 is estimated by a correlated random effects (CRE) probit model. The advantage of the
CRE probit model is that it places some structure on the nature of the correlation between
unobserved effects and the covariates. In order to capture the municipality fixed effects,
we include the means of all the controls at the municipality level across time as additional
controls in the model. We use instruments here as well to deal with the endogeneity of
education quality thereby estimating a CRE IV-probit model.12
1.4.4. Identification Issues
With reverse causality present from violence to education, a simple Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) estimation of our baseline model is not likely to yield unbiased or consis-
tent estimates of the impact of education quality on violence measures. Moreover, education
quality is likely endogenous even otherwise, since test scores are a noisy proxy of true ed-
ucation quality. We therefore employ an Instrumental Variable approach to find a causal
impact of education quality on violence. We use two instruments in our model.
Our first instrument is constructed from the data on central government transfers to
municipalities for investment in quality of education. Quality of education depends on central
government’s allocation of funds to municipalities. Transfer of funds for investment in quality
of education to every municipality is based on three criteria, which are, population projected
12We run a linear probability model for this as well and find a negative impact of education quality on
likelihood that the illegal armed group is present in the municipality but the estimates are not statistically
different from zero and thus maybe imprecisely estimated.
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to attend school in the municipality, population that attended school in the municipality
and a measure of equality between municipalities.13 Given this, transfers directly assigned
to a municipality is likely endogenous since there could be unobservables associated with
this process of allocation of funds that are correlated with violence in the municipality.
Thus, we do not use the central transfers directly to municipality m as this may impact
violence in municipality m directly and would violate the exclusion restriction required for a
valid instrument. Instead, our instrument is based on transfers allocated to the neighboring
municipalities. The central government has a fixed budget for education in a state and
distributes it to different municipalities within the state. Funds allocated to the neighboring
municipalities thus affect the funds allocated to municipality m which in turn would affect the
quality of education in m. We believe that such investments do not have a contemporaneous
correlation with test scores. Additionally, such investments have a gestation period and
take time to have an impact. Moreover, in construction of our instrument, we exclude the
neighboring municipalities that share a common border with m because government funds
to the neighbors may still impact violence in m due to easy mobility between municipalities
which share borders with m. To avoid such spillovers, we exclude the first ring of neighbors.
Our instrument is therefore, the average of the funds for investment in quality of education
allocated to the neighboring municipalities of m eliminating the first ring of neighbors in
time period t− 1.
The second instrument is also based on the central government investment for education
quality in municipality, m however it is constructed using a ‘shift-share’ formula. We take
the base year of 2001 for investment in education and calculate the share of government
funds allocated to each municipality in 2001, sm,2001.
14 This is municipality specific and
time invariant. The shift-share of investment is calculated by multiplying the share sm,2001
by the total central government budget in years 2007 to 2013. We use one period lag of
the shift-share of investment as the instrument given the belief that education quality has a
13Details on the institutional framework is provided in the next section.
14The year 2001 is considered due to availability of data.
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lagged impact on violence and crime. This is posited to be exogenous since the proportion of
funds are based on the year 2001 making it time invariant and unlikely to be correlated with
violence or crime today. It can be argued that violence in Colombia is persistent which could
invalidate the exogeneity restriction. However, during this decade, violence at an aggregate
level has been on a declining trend. Thus, the fixed share of government investment in
education quality in 2001 will not likely influence or be influenced by violence rates today.15
Since our instruments are predictors for educational quality, for which we use student test
scores, all our instruments are employed at per capita level.
1.4.5. Institutional Framework
The political constitution of 1991 required the central government in Colombia to pro-
vide resources to states, special districts and municipalities with the aim of encouraging
decentralization.16 Fraction of transfers to states and special districts were called Situado
Fiscal (SF) and the fraction to municipalities were called municipalities participation (PM
by its acronym in Spanish). The SF and PM resources were calculated as a fraction of the
current national revenue (ICN by its acronym in Spanish). Resources constituting the SF
were to be spent on education and health, whereas the PM on health, education, potable
water, physical education, recreation, sports and investment.
Post the 1999 crisis, the initial system of allocation was reformed, the SF was eliminated
and replaced by a General System of Participation (SGP by its acronym in Spanish). The
resources allocated were to be invested in education (58.5%), health (24.5%) and general
purposes (17%) in the states and municipalities. The criteria of transfers extended overtime
to include population that attended school; population projected to attend school; equality
15One concern that could arise here is that even though the trend of violence is declining, if there exists
a positive serial correlation between the violence measures over time, then central government allocations in
2001 may still be correlated with violence today. However, in our analysis, we cluster the standard errors at
municipality level which takes care of the serial correlation in the idiosyncratic error term (Drukker, 2003;
Wooldridge, 2010). Moreover, we see no serial correlation between most of violence measures from 2007-2013
except for the case of homicide rates and rate of household thefts.
16An excellent summary of the way the fiscal decentralization works in Colombia may be found in Bonet
et al. (2014). This section is mainly based on this document.
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and administrative efficiency for health; relative poverty, rural and urban population, fiscal
and administrative efficiency for general purposes.
This system underwent further reform in 2007. The new law included investment in
education, health and general purposes as well as potable water and basic sanitation. Share
of resources to be allocated changed to 58.5% for education, 24.5% for health, 11.6% for
potable water and basic sanitation and 5.4% for general purposes.17
By 2012, the SGP represented 4% of the GDP, 30% of the ICN and 15.7% of the total
public expenditure (Bonet et al., 2014). With respect to education, its share in ICN changed
from 23.17% in 2002 to 16.61% in 2012. This sector receives the biggest portion of the
national transfers. The reform in 2007 sought to include quantity and quality criteria in
education. The main goal was to increase coverage to 100% of territory and improve the
score on the standardized test that we is used in this paper.18
1.5. Results
1.5.1. Crime Rate
Our measure of education quality is the average of the selection-corrected median scores
in all subjects (see section 1.4.1). Table (1.1) shows the effects of test scores on the index
of crime rate. The first six columns present the OLS estimates of equation (1.1), where
column 6 presents the reduced form of the same equation but with the instruments instead
of our measure of education quality. The first column shows the simple correlation without
controls, fixed effects, and trend. As it is shown in Figures (A.1-A.4), the correlation is
positive. However, when we include both fixed effects and trend, the effect becomes negative.
When we include the demographic and the economic controls, the impact remains negative
and significative. When the measures of quantity of education are included as well as the
variables that capture economic growth, the effect of test scores on crime rate is consistently
17The Congress and central government follow a strategy to control and monitor the way the resources
are invested under this reform.
18We do not discuss whether the quality goal has been achieved.
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negative and significative. This implies that quality is more important than quantity of
education. Finally, the reduced form in column 6 shows that the impact of the spatial
instrument is negative, as expected.
Column 7 shows the result of the instrumental variable estimation, which corrects the
identification issues. Our model fairs well on all specification tests. We report the p-value
of the Kleibergen Paap rk LM statistic which depicts the underidentification test. The
null here is that the model is underidentified and we are able to safely reject the null for
all six specifications implying that our instruments are relevant and correlated with the
endogenous regressor. The Kleibergen Paap F statistic is also reported which depicts the
weak-identification test. The F statistic is well above 10 across all specification suggesting
absence of weak-instrument problem. Since we use two instruments, we report the Hansen J
statistic for overidentification of our model. The null here is that the instruments are jointly
valid and we do not reject the null in our specifications (see Baum et al., 2007).
The point estimate from Table (1.2) suggests that one standard deviation increase in
average median score leads to a decline of approximately 5.9 standard deviations in the
crime index.
1.5.2. Property Crimes
Tables (1.2) depicts the impact of test scores on the crime index described in subsection
1.5.1, the index of property crime, as well as the index of violent crime. Our models fair well
on all specification tests.
The point estimates from Table (1.2) suggests that one standard deviation increase in
average median test scores leads to a decline of approximately 6.2 standard deviations in the
index of economic crime. In accordance with this result, when we look at a disaggregated
analysis of the crime separately in Table (1.3), we find that that test scores leads to a
statistically significant decline in rate of theft on cars. An increase in average median test
scores in all subjects by one standard deviation results in a marginal decline of 6.4 standard
deviations in the rate of theft on cars. These results support the assertion that better quality
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of education has an ‘opportunity cost effect’ on such property crimes. Better performance
in the school-exit examination encourages students for better potential opportunities in the
labor market increasing their opportunity cost of engaging in criminal behavior.
1.5.3. Violent Crimes
Table (1.2) shows in column 3 the effects of test scores on the index of violent crimes and
columns 5-8 in Table (1.3) show disaggregated violent crimes like total kidnapping rates,
political, and non-political kidnapping rates, and homicide rates, respectively. As before,
our models do well on the specification tests and our instruments are valid and strong. If
the effect of education quality is found to be negative on these measures, one could assert a
‘pacifying effect’ of education in play.
Notice that the impact of test scores on the z-score index of violent crime suggests a
positive impact however the effects are not precisely estimated (column 3 Table 1.2). Upon
disaggregation, we find a statistically significant and negative impact of test scores on total
kidnapping rates as shown in column 5 Table (1.3). An increase in average median test scores
in all subjects by one standard deviation results in a decline of approximately 3.3 standard
deviations in total kidnapping rates and 4.6 standard deviations in non political kidnapping
rate.
1.5.4. Conflict
Results for the model 1.2 from Table (1.4) suggests that better quality of education
lowers the likelihood of presence of illegal armed groups in the municipalities. From the
marginal effects, notice that one standard deviation increase in test scores leads to a decline
in probability that FARC is present in the municipality by 1.1 percent, and either FARC
or ELN by approximately 1 percent. These marginal effects are found to be statistically
significant.19
19We find better education quality reduces the presence of coca crops but the marginal effect is not found
to be significant.
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As a consequence of the above models estimated, we assert that the results are indicative
of a ‘pacifying effect’ since a decline in the likelihood of presence of illegal armed groups is
found.
1.6. Transmission Channel
The results presented above indicate that both the ‘opportunity cost’ and the ‘pacifying’
effects explain the impact of quality of education on crime. To confirm if the mechanism
behind the negative effect of education on property crime is the ‘opportunity cost’ effect,
we estimate a similar model represented in equation (1.1), but with an outcome variable
that signifies development. This is done to tease out the effect of quality of education from
quantity. Better educational attainment is found to be correlated with higher economic
growth or development. Recent literature has shown that one way to measure economic
growth is through satellite data on night lights. The advantage of using light intensity is
that the measure of economic activity can even cover areas that are typically difficult to
access. Additionally, lights data have high spatial resolution, and is able to access sub-
national levels as well (Henderson et al., 2012; Donaldson and Storeygard, 2016). Table
(1.5) presents the results.
We find that quality of education remains a more important factor in explaining the
positive impact on development. In particular, the point estimate shows that one standard
deviation increase on the test scores increases the per capita mean of light intensity in approx-




We carry out sub-sample analyses to check the robustness of our models (see Appendix).
First, we exclude Bogota from the full sample (Tables A.2 and A.3) as well as all capital
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cities from the full sample (Tables A.4 and A.5) and the results are found to be broadly
similar to the baseline results in terms of the direction and magnitude of the impact. The
results are statistically significant and the models perform well on all diagnostic tests.
Second, we run a robustness check by restricting our sample to municipalities with pop-
ulation less than 200,000 to give some indication of how results change for smaller and more
rural areas (Tables A.6 and A.7). Results are robust and remain the same as the benchmark
model we estimate.
Lastly, we explore the rural-urban divide and choose municipalities with the proportion
of rural population greater than half of the total municipality population to evaluate the
effect for rural areas (Tables A.8 and A.9). We find statistically significant results similar
to our benchmark case, although at a disaggregated level only non political kidnappings
exhibits significant results. However, restricting our sample to include only urban areas with
the proportion of rural population less than half of the total, we find that the effects are
the opposite to those we found in rural areas. Specifically, the test scores affects negatively
the index of violent crime and the homicide rate. These results are statistically significant
(Tables A.10 and A.11), although the models do not perform well on the underidentification
test. This suggests that rural areas may be driving most of our baseline results.
1.7.2. Other Government Transfers
We run our baseline model using two different instruments for education quality - spatial
as well as shift-share - based on central government transfers to municipalities for other
purposes and not investment in education quality. These transfers to municipalities are
for purposes of education, health, food and general purposes (Tables A.12 and A.13). We
find our models to do well on the specification tests as the baseline. The coefficients for
the aggregated measures of crime maintain the expected sign but only property crime is
statistically significant. At disaggregated levels, the results remain the same but are not
precisely estimated. This suggests that the transfers from central government for other
purposes are good predictors of education quality but they do not have statistically significant
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impact on our outcome variables. This perhaps implies that our baseline model does in fact
capture the impact of transfers from the central government for the purpose of improving
quality of education specifically on violence through test scores. The same effects are not
found through other kinds of transfers from the central government to the municipalities.
Further, we include these transfers to municipality for other purposes as mentioned above
as an additional regressor in our models (Tables A.14 and A.15). We then replace per capita
total expenditures by per capita total transfers (Tables A.16 and A.17). Finally, we instru-
ment this variable by constructing spatial and shift-share instruments based on central gov-
ernment transfers for other purposes to neighboring municipalities (Tables A.18 and A.19).
We instrument both education quality and central government transfer to municipalities for
other purposes. We estimate this model to study if our results are not merely capturing state
presence in terms of transfers of funds to municipalities. Our instruments become weak or
not valid in most of the specifications. In those specifications in which the instruments are
valid (Tables A.14, column 3; A.15 columns 2-8), the results remain the same as the baseline.
However, we find that the variable capturing transfers from the center to each municipality
for general purposes has no economic impact on crime and violence measures. The coefficient
associated with the regressor is of the order of zero. The effect of test scores change slightly
in terms of magnitude but the sign remains broadly robust to the baseline. This suggests
that we are perhaps capturing the effect of education quality and not just state presence in
general.
1.7.3. Other Measures of Education Quality
We carry out our analysis using other measures of education quality to compare if our
results change from the baseline. Other measures used are average of median selection-
corrected test scores in specific subjects like mathematics and language depicting cognitive
ability of students and philosophy and social sciences depicting social area; and the original
test scores in the exam provided by ICFES without correcting for self-selection (Tables A.20-
A.25).
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We find our results to be robust when consider the aggregated measure of crime and the
measure of education quality used are the median scores in cognitive subjects, social areas,
and total score. The models perform well on the specification tests and instruments are valid
and relevant based on the underidentification, weak-identification as well as overidentification
tests. Our results are similar to baseline model. However, when we use disaggregated levels
of crime, the models perform well only when we use the average score in social areas, and
the results are similar to those found in the baseline. The signs of the coefficients are as
expected and the statistical significance remain robust.
1.8. Conclusion
This paper attempts to understand if the inherent assumptions about the trade-offs as-
sociated with education, work and involvement in violent or criminal activity do in fact exist
(Lochner, 2004). Theoretically, education quality can have ambiguous impacts on crimes.
Better quality of education may have an opportunity cost effect that reduces incentives of
engaging in criminal activities due to higher future labor market returns; or a pacifying ef-
fect on crime as a result of more political and social stability. Better education quality may
even lead to organized violence or sometimes indoctrination of political ideas on account of
ideological differences fueled through education systems. In this paper, we evaluate the first
two hypotheses and using an Instrumental Variable approach, we gauge the causal impact
of education quality on violence and crime. Although the paper uses Colombia as a case,
the results found could be applied to wider range of countries with a history of violence.
Our measure of quality of education is the performance of students in a mandatory
standardized examination at the last level of high school. We correct for selection bias in
the test scores to minimize measurement error since test scores are conditional on taking
the exam. We estimate the municipality level drop out rates using the Census sample and
impute zeros as the grades for those students who neither finished nor were enrolled in high
school for this examination. We arrive at the selection bias corrected test scores and use the
standardized average median scores across subjects indicating education quality as a more
21
accurate measure of central tendencies. Crime outcomes are given by theft rates, kidnapping
rates, and homicide rates.
We instrument education quality by constructing spatial instruments based on central
government transfers of funds for improving quality of education to neighboring municipal-
ities of a municipality in consideration. We also use instruments based on the investment
by central government into education quality in every municipality in 2001 and construct
shift-share of investments in each municipality for the periods 2007-2013.
Our results suggest that education quality could have differential impacts on different
forms of crimes. Improvement in quality of education has a statistically significant and
negative impact on an aggregate measure of crime and property crimes one period later.
Furthermore, a disaggregated analysis of economic crime rates shows that the higher the
median scores in the exam, the lower the rates of theft on cars one period hence. This
is in line with an opportunity cost effect thus lowering the incentives of engaging in such
economic crimes. We also find that better education quality leads to a statistically significant
but marginal decline in total and non-political kidnappings. Besides we find better education
quality reduces the presence of illegal armed groups in municipalities suggesting a pacifying
effect.
Our results speak to the importance of designing educational policies that focus not only
on increasing the quantity of education in terms of higher enrollments, years of education
or construction of more educational establishments as suggested by previous works but also



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.2. Crime and Education Quality
Crime Rate Economic Crime Violent Crime
(1) (2) (3)
Average Score in Subjects -5.85*** -6.17*** 0.26
(2.06) (2.24) (0.99)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Trend Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 -2.72 -3.00 -0.20
Observations 4486 4491 6134
Underidentification 0.012 0.011 0.001
Weak Identification 22.412 22.412 22.190
Overidentification 0.503 0.614 0.804
Notes: Standardized coefficients from Instrumental Variable (IV) re-
gression. Heteroskedasticity robust standard error estimates clus-
tered at municipality level are reported in parentheses; *** denotes
statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the
10% level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests. Underidentification Test
reports the p-value for the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk statistic with
rejection implying identification; F-stat reports the Kleibergen-Paap
F statistic and Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic for weak identification;
Overidentification test reports the p-value for the Hansen J statistic







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.4. Presence and Quality of Education
FARC ELN Either
(1) (2) (3)
Average Score in Subjects -0.072** -0.002 -0.071**
(0.033) (0.047) (0.033)
Control Yes Yes Yes
Controls Mean Yes Yes Yes
N 6215 6215 6215
Note: Estimation is via Instrumental Variable approach. Dependent vari-
ables are rates of different forms of violence per 100000 inhabitants. Con-
trol variables include birth rate, death rate, infant mortality rate, years of
establishment of municipality, rurality index, agricultural yield and fiscal
characteristics. Clustered standard error estimates are reported in paren-
theses; ∗∗∗ denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5%
level, and ∗ at the 10% level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table 1.5. Lights and Education Quality
Mean of Lights
OLS Reduced Form IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Average Score in Subjects 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.32*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 1.92*
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (1.05)
Total Population (log) 0.21 3.07*** 3.07*** 3.20*** 5.66***
(0.64) (0.69) (0.69) (1.02) (1.60)
Birth Rate -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Infant Mortality Rate -0.65*** -0.32** -0.32** -0.21 -0.48**
(0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.19)
Rurality Index -1.73*** -0.91*** -0.90*** -1.54*** -2.46***
(0.36) (0.33) (0.33) (0.56) (0.72)
Agricultural Yield 0.08* 0.07* 0.07* 0.07 0.07
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Projected Population to Attend Primary School (log) -1.40*** -1.39*** -1.69*** -2.41***
(0.43) (0.43) (0.57) (0.64)
Projected Population to Attend Secundary School (log) -1.59*** -1.59*** -1.32** -3.01***
(0.46) (0.46) (0.53) (1.06)
Per Capita Total Expenditure -0.01 -0.05 -0.01
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Per Capita Total Tax Revenue 0.01 0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
L.Per Capita Average Investment in Quality of Neighbors 0.09**
(0.05)
L.Per Capita Shift Share of Investment on Quality -0.01
(0.01)
Municipality FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trend No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.08 -0.42




Notes: Standardized coefficients from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Instrumental Variable (IV) regressions. Heteroskedas-
ticity robust standard error estimates clustered at municipality level are reported in parentheses; *** denotes statistical
significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests. Underidentification
Test reports the p-value for the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk statistic with rejection implying identification; Endogeneity Test
reports the p-value with null being variable is exogenous; F-stat reports the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic and Cragg-Donald
Wald F statistic for weak identification; Overidentification test reports the p-value for the Hansen J statistic with the null
being that the instruments are jointly valid.
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Chapter 2
ECOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF LAND INEQUALITY, POLITICAL PREFERENCES,
AND CONFLICT1
2.1. Introduction
The origin of (income, land, property) inequality and conflict has been subject of several
studies and mainly attributed to persistent effects of uneven distribution of geographical,
cultural, institutional and human characteristics across the globe. Specifically, theoretical
models and empirical evidence suggest that variation in geography has shaped contemporary
differences in development across regions, countries and different subnational levels (Fenske,
2014; Galor and Özak, 2016), as well as institutions in the past have contributed to long-
run development (Acemoglu et al., 2012) and conflict at subnational levels (Buonanno and
Vargas, 2017). Despite the above, the geographical origins of both relationship and the study
of potential mechanisms that explain the results remain unexplored.
This paper explores the geographical roots of the coevolution of inequality and conflict.
In particular, it advances the hypothesis and empirically studies the impact of ecological
diversity in the persistence of uneven distribution as well as civil conflict, in an environment
in which ethnic diversity is not a driving force that explains the empirical results.
The hypotheses proposed in this research are supported by different theoretical and empir-
ical results. First, there is a positive relationship between some geographical characteristics
and economic specialization. In particular, Bates (1987) suggests that the origin of state
is positively associated to the gains of trade and promotion of markets. Any economy can
benefit by increasing trade of products from diverse ecological zones. These ecological zones
lie with formation of states (Fenske, 2014).
1With Ömer Özak (Southern Methodist University).
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Second, a positive relationship between economic specialization, both internal and inter-
national trade, and inequality has been established. Specifically, positive trend of income
of abundant factors, increasing skill premia and search frictions in import-competing sec-
tors contribute to increasing inequality though higher levels of trade (Harrison et al., 2011).
Thus, if diversity in ecological zones are positively related to economic specialization and
more trade increases inequality, we assert the hypothesis that ecological diversity contributes
to more inequality.
Finally, this ecological diversity will be associated with more conflict insofar as there are
more resources to exploit and more gains from economic specialization. Recent literature
highlights the association between economic environment and civil conflict. Countries where
weather shocks have a significant impact on production, in particular on sectors that are
not highly technified such as the agricultural sector, are more exposed to conflict through
an income effect.2 Geographical variation of wealth and income may trigger or even cause
conflicts (Buhaug et al., 2011; Hsiang et al., 2013).
In this paper, we establish the impact of ecological diversity on both inequality and
conflict, following which we use political preferences as a potential channel to explain these
relationships. We use results in elections as a measure of political preferences. In regions with
more ecological diversity, and thus more inequality and conflict, society will likely express
its political preferences for parties that advocate to reduce inequality and thus conflict.
We propose an empirical strategy to mitigate the potential endogeneity problems that
arise in the investigation of the impact of ecological diversity on inequality and conflict. First,
to overcome the measurement error problem, we build a spatial instrument. In particular, we
use the ecological diversity of non-immediate neighbors as an exogenous variation to identify
the causal impact of ecological diversity on inequality and conflict.
2Miguel et al. (2004) use rainfall variation as an exogenous source of economic growth. They find that a
negative growth shock will likely increase the likelihood of conflict. This is particularly true for origin but
not for duration of conflict.They consider that a potential mechanism to explain their findings is the fact
that a negative shock on growth may have an impact on inequality, through an increase on social tensions.
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Second, in order to tackle the existence of omitted variables that may drive the proposed
relationship between ecological diversity and both inequality and conflict, we include a set
of geographical controls as well as state fixed effects. Moreover, we include the geographical
characteristics of non-immediate neighbors to assure that the impact of ecological diversity
of neighboring municipalities is driving the results.
Third, to account for the possibility that ecological regions of certain areas may be
affected by land owners, we follow the spatial IV/fixed effects strategy to overcome the
reverse causality problem.
Studies that aim to explain inequality, typically utilize an income inequality measure.3
The fact that countries have urbanized in the recent times has facilitated the use of income
inequality for inequality. However, some conflicts are found to have originated by the con-
centration of production factors, of which land is a primary example (especially in developing
countries). We propose that land concentration helps us understand the coevolution of in-
equality and conflict, specifically in countries where ethnic diversity might not be a potential
explanatory variable of that coevolution.
This research is the first to study the geographic determinants of the coevolution of
inequality and conflict. It contributes to the literature on the relationship between inequality
and conflict (Butler, 2005), determinants of inequality (Roine et al., 2009), and origins of
conflict (Blattman and Miguel, 2010). It also builds on the literature on long-run comparative
development (Diamond, 1998; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013a,b; Galor and Özak,
2016; Özak, 2018, among others).
Our results suggest that ecological diversity is an important determinant to understand
land inequality and conflict. These results are robust to the inclusion of institutions (presence
of churches, financial institutions, health care and educational facilities), sectoral composition
(agricultural, industry and services), market access (distant to country and state capital), and
historical variables (presence of Spaniards, natives and slaves). We also find that ecological
diversity is positively associated with the difference in votes between a party that promotes
3See for instance Buonanno and Vargas (2017).
30
progressive policies and the more conservative party, as well as majority of a progressive
party. Finally, we find that there is a negative association between ecological diversity and
majority of a more conservative party. This channel is a potential mechanism to understand
the results on inequality and conflict.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2.2 presents the empirical
and identification strategy, section 2.3 presents the results, and section 2.4 concludes.
2.2. Empirical Structure and Identification Strategy
This section explains the empirical strategy and the data utilized to test the hypotheses.
2.2.1. Empirical Model
The empirical analysis estimates the impact of ecological diversity on inequality and
conflict using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS):
ysm = β0 + β1Esm + β2Xsm + µs + εsm (2.1)
where ysm is the outcome variable in state s, municipality m, Esm is municipality level
measure of Ecological Diversity, µs are state fixed effects, εsm the mean zero error term in
equation. Parameter of interest is β1 giving us the impact of ecodiversity on inequality.
Xm are the set of municipal covariates that we include in order to overcome the potential
confounding effects of other geographical characteristics that might drive the relationship
between the outcome variable and ecological diversity.
2.2.2. Identification Strategy
The estimation of parameter β1 in equation (2.1) by OLS clearly does not imply causal-
ity due to several concerns. First, ecological diversity is an aggregated measure of several
ecological types present in a particular region. This measure of diversity may thus be mis-
measured, producing a biased and inconsistent estimation of β1 as the real β1 is nonzero.
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Second, there might be omitted confounders that generate the problem of unobserved het-
erogeneity. Finally, it is possible that land owners affect ecological diversity which would
lead to a reverse causality problem.
To overcome these endogeneity issues, we propose the following strategies. Using a spatial
instrumental variable (IV) approach, we exploit the exogenous variation of the ecological
diversity of municipalities that are not immediate neighbors, that is, that are part of the
second ring of neighbors of each municipality. This IV will exclude the possibility of spillover
effects of the ecological diversity of immediate neighbors.
The inclusion of state fixed effects will allow us to potentially reduce the omitted variable
bias as there might be common factors that affect states and are not observed. Moreover, we
include not only the geographical characteristics of each municipality but also the geograph-
ical characteristics of non immediate neighbors as control variables to reduce the problem
of confounding controls that might drive the relationship between any outcome variable and
ecological diversity.
The equation to be estimated by the IV/fixed effects approach described above may be
represented by
ysm = β0 + β1Esm + β2Xsm + β3X−sm + µs + εsm (2.2)
where X−m represents the geographical control variables of non immediate neighbors.
2.2.3. Data
We test the hypotheses formulated above using Colombian data. This case is interesting
as it is a country that has exhibited several episodes of conflict and violence since XVIII
century. Moreover, ethnic diversity is hardly one of the main determinants of those episodes.
Our main source of data is the Municipality Panel built by the Center of Economic
Development Studies-Universidad de los Andes (CEDE by its acronym in Spanish). This
panel contains information of 1122 municipalities and covers a period of time from 1993
through 2013.
32
The primary sources of the panel are Colombian public and private institutes and it
includes socioeconomic, fiscal, geographical, and agricultural information.
2.2.3.1. Outcome Variables
The first outcome variable is inequality. As opposed to other studies that use income
inequality as a main inequality measure, we use land inequality. The CEDE-Uniandes cal-
culate the Gini using the Colombian cadastre. They use registration of property for their
analysis. Each registry contains information about property size, value and proprietor.
We use two measures of inequality: Land Inequality and Property Inequality. Land
inequality is calculated using the size. On the other hand, Property Inequality is calculated
by identifying the proprietors and their registered properties.
The second outcome variable is conflict. We use information from Riascos Grueso (1949).
This book presents information on battles and civil wars presented in 19th century in Colom-
bia. We also use information from LeGrand (1986), where there is documentation of land
conflicts in Colombia.
Third, we use information on elections in Colombia. The first database we have access
to is the 1856 Presidential election compiled by Bushnell (1970). This is the first election
in which the direct vote was used in Colombia. The information is at municipality level.
We use the election for the House of Representatives organized in 1958, after La Violencia
period.4
2.2.3.2. Main Independent Variable
The main independent variable is Ecological Diversity. Ecological diversity is a type of
biodiversity and measures the variation in the ecosystem found in a particular region. It
includes terrestrial as well as aquatic ecosystems and takes into account the variation in the
complexity of a biological community.
4This information is publicly available by the Colombian electoral institution (Registraduŕıa Nacional del
Estado Civil) and can be downloaded from the CEDE website.
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Olson et al. (2001) develop a map of the ecoregions that helps to identify biodiversity.
They define an ecoregion as a large land unit containing species and natural communities
with boundaries. Figure (B.1) shows the type of ecological zones in Colombia, based on
Olson et al. (2001).5
We then follow Fenske (2014) to calculate Ecological Diversity (Ei). We construct a
Herfindahl index using the share stm of each municipality m’s area that is occupied by each






Em indicates how diverse a region, in this case a municipality, is. Figure (B.2) maps the
geographical distribution of ecological diversity across Colombia.
2.2.3.3. Control Variables
As mentioned in Subsection 2.2.2 we include several confounding geographical charac-
teristics that account for other geographical root of the relationship between the outcome
variable and ecological diversity. In all specifications we include area, absolute latitude, eleva-
tion, precipitation, temperature, area within 100kms of sea, average crop yield (pre-1500CE),
share of area within 100kms of perennial water, share of area within 100kms of fluctuating
water, ruggedness, coast length, pre-industrial mobility, malaria, agricultural suitability (cli-
matic), temperature spatial correlation, temperature volatility. This information is taken
from Galor and Özak (2015, 2016).
We also report robustness checks in which we account for institutions (presence of
Catholic or no-Catholic churches, financial institutions, health care facilities, and educa-
tional institutions like public libraries, public, private, and middle schools), market access
(distance to country capital, state capital, major and secondary wholesale markets, and ru-
rality index), sectorial composition of production (agricultural, industries and services as a
5Olson et al. (2001) provide a global dataset of biomes with 16 ecological zones. According to the
FAO, an ecological zone is “...a land resource mapping unit, defined in terms of climate, landform and
soils, and/or land cover, and having a specific range of potentials and constraints for land use.” See http:
//www.fao.org/docrep/w2962e/w2962e-03.htm.
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fraction of the municipality GDP). This information is provided by the Municipality Panel
and its main sources are the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE by
its acronym in Spanish), the 2005 Colombian Census, the Geographical Institute (IGAC),
and the National Administrative Department of Planning (DNP).
In order to control for historical roots of the outcome variables, we also report robustness
results obtained by including the presence of Spaniards and Natives between 1535 and 1540
(Melo, 1996) and Presence of Slaves (1843 Colombian Census and Tovar and Tovar, 2009).
Summary statistics of all variables used in the analysis are provided in Table B.1.
2.2.4. Historical Context
Colombia has a long history of violence and land is an important factor that explains the
origin and persistence of conflict (Riascos Grueso, 1949; Safford and Palacios, 2002; Sánchez
et al., 2010; Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2013). Political disputes since conquest
and colonization, high land value and weak enforcement of property rights and law have
contributed to this long history of conflict.
Safford and Palacios (2002) emphasize the fact that geography has contributed to having
a fragmented country. This spatial fragmentation has played an important role in uneven
development, economic atomization and cultural differentiation of Colombia.
Since its Independence and consolidation of Independence in the first half of 19th Century,
Colombia has been exposed to both local and national civil conflicts, that have shaped its
uneven development.
Independence movement emerged as a response to the tyranny of Spaniards who where
in control of most of the offices at national and local level. It did not surge against the
colonization itself, as Creoles respected Spaniard monarchy as a highest authority. However,
the fact that Spanish empire got involved in a conflict with Napoleon, limited its sources
of financing the war and increased its demands for more revenue from Colonies. Creoles
manifested their discontent with local authorities that increase taxes to finance the war.
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In addition to above, the Independence movement originated as a response to the discon-
tent of Creoles because they did not have access to different political positions as well as their
sense of delay in scientific and economic development (Safford and Palacios, 2002). Bothe
the political discontent and then the necessity of fight for the consolidation of independence
help to explain the conflicts generated in first half of 19th Century (Riascos Grueso, 1949).
After a period of political disarray referred to Patria Boba (1810-1816) and separation of
Ecuador, Perú and Venezuela, the traditional political parties originated: the conservador
and the liberal, mainly due to the political dispute between Simón Boĺıvar and Francisco de
Paula Santander, the first two presidents of Colombia.
The conservador party defended the institutions from the Colony and gave the Catholic
church power and inclusion in state affairs as well as was against slavery abolition, as it
could affect its economic interests. On the other hand, liberal party sought to implement
more progressive reforms such as reduction in the role of government in economic affairs,
slavery abolition, religious freedom, among other policies. Although in general the parties
managed to solve their disputes pacifically, they were involved in episodes of civil conflict.
They both were involved in periods of violent conflict at the end of 19th century,6 and
La Violencia period (1948-1958), which was a time after the assassination of Jorge Eliécer
Gaitán.7
Violence was a tool to compete for rents of power, and apart from the first part of
19th century, where wars were driven mainly by consolidation of independence, economic
reasons explain most of political conflicts since then (Riascos Grueso, 1949; Mazzuca and
Robinson, 2009; Fergusson and Vargas, 2013). Among the economic factors that explain
violent conflict, land distribution plays a significant role in Colombian context (LeGrand,
1986; Sánchez et al., 2010; López-Uribe and Sánchez, 2017).
6At the end of 19th century, they fought each other in La Guerra de los Mil Dı́as (the Thousands Days’
War), which facilitated the separation of Panama in 1903. This war was caused by the suspicious of electoral
fraud in 1899 elections and an economic crisis caused by the reduction of international price of coffee.
7Gaitán was a liberal politician that emerged as a leader of people against to what he called oligarchy.
His opponents labeled him as a populist, as he advocated to give more voice to people as well as was an
opponent of the Colombian elites, yet he was part of one of the more traditional political parties.
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On the other hand, Posada-Carbó (1995) argues that there is a strong relationship be-
tween elections and violence in Colombia. Colombia had 27 presidential elections between
1830 and 1930. These elections were competitive on 25 occasions and only two times there
was a clear contestant. Regional rebellions originated by potential electoral fraud, sometimes
scaled up to civil wars.
th and 20th centuries were violent periods and the wars were originated by both politi-
cal and economic reasons (Riascos Grueso, 1949; Safford and Palacios, 2002; Mazzuca and
Robinson, 2009; Fergusson and Vargas, 2013).
2.3. Results
2.3.1. Land Inequality
Table 2.1 reports the standardized coefficients from OLS regressions between land inequal-
ity and ecological diversity. Columns (1) and (5) report the simple correlations, columns (2)
and (6) include state fixed effects, columns (3) and (6) include some basic geographical con-
trols and columns (4) and (8) show the result when all geographical controls are included.
As we can see, the coefficient oscillates between 0.28 and 0.21 when we use landholding in-
equality and between 0.22 and 0.13 when we use landholder inequality.8 Figure (2.1) shows
the result of the OLS regression: an increase in 1 standard deviation of ecological diversity
leads to an increase in 0.21 standard deviations in land inequality.
8As we lose a significant number of observations, our preferred measure will be landholding inequality,
although the results on landholder inequality remain the same in both basic and robustness exercises.
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However, the results reported in Table 2.1 are biased as we discussed in Subsection 2.2.2.
Table 2.2 shows the results when we address the endogeneity problem. In this Table we also
report two specification tests. We report the p-value of the Kleibergen Paap rk LM statistic
which depicts the underidentification test. The null here is that the model is underidentified
and we are able to safely reject the null for all six specifications implying that our instruments
are relevant and correlated with the endogenous regressor. The Kleibergen Paap F statistic
is also reported which depicts the weak-identification test.
Figure (2.2) shows the coefficient of ecological diversity after controlling for all geograph-
ical variables. An increase in 1 standard deviation of ecological diversity leads to an increase
in 0.42 standard deviations in land inequality. Both underidentification and weak instru-
ment diagnostic tests perform well. The F statistic is well above 10 across all specification
suggesting absence of weak-instrument problem.
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2.3.2. Conflict
In this section we report the results for the specification (2.2) with conflict as an outcome
variable. Table 2.3 report the results of OLS and IV estimations considering occurrence and
intensity of conflict in 19th century. Columns (1)-(3) and (7)-(9) show the linear probability
model of having conflict in 19th century, before 1850, and after 1850. Alternatively, columns
(4)-(6) and (10-12) use intensity of conflict (number of battles) as an outcome variable.
This distinction is particularly important as in the first half of the century, Colombia
was in permanent battles for Independence and its consolidation, whereas in the second half
most of the political and socio economic conflicts started to emerged.
Results in Table 2.3 show a positive association between ecological diversity and land
inequality. While columns (1)-(6) show the results of an OLS estimation, columns (7)-(12)
show the IV estimation results. We see that both occurrence and intensity are positively
caused by an increase in ecological diversity when we consider the 19th century as well as
battles after 1850. Figures (2.3) and (2.4) show that the coefficients are significant.
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An interesting result of this exercise is the placebo test that ensures that results are
closely describing what we propose in the paper. If we look at the coefficient of ecological
diversity when the outcome variable is battles before 1850 (emergence and consolidation of
Independence), the coefficients are not significant. Graphs in Figure (2.5) shows graphically
the results from Table 2.3. These results are robust to the inclusion of historical variables.
(Tables B.5-B.7)
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On the other hand, Table 2.4 shows the results when the outcome variable is the occur-
rence of La Violencia. Column (3) of Table 2.4 shows that an increase in ecological diversity
increases the probability of having suffered conflict related to La Violencia. This result is
robust to the inclusion of historical variables. The same result is observed in Figure 2.6.
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2.3.3. Potential Transmission Channel: Political Preferences
In this section we explore the transmission channel that may explain the results presented
above. Specifically, we use political preferences expressed in two elections. The first one was
a presidential election and was the first elections in which the universal suffrage of males was
introduced and the results were obtained by direct vote (Bushnell, 1970).
The other election utilized is the 1958 House of Representatives election. This election
took place immediately after Colombian political parties negotiated the termination of La
Violencia period. Both liberal and conservador parties decided to alternate presidential
power, that is, one period the president was going to be liberal and the next one conservador.
This is the reason why we do not use the presidential election results.
The results observed in the elections as a way of expressing collective preferences may
be a transmission channel for two reasons. First, it is the way society expresses to appoint
officers that will take decisions of public policies and how democracy aggregates preferences.
On the other hand, beyond significant differences in the policies and agenda of the parties,
La Violencia was a conflict originated by the confrontation among liberales and conservadores
after assassination of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, the popular leader who was going to be likely
elected in 1948 elections and whose ideas were based on the idea of giving more voice to
people instead of, what he used to called, the oligarchy or the elite.
The difference among parties ideas is important in particular because liberales advocate
for less inequality as opposed to conservadores. The outcome variables of this empirical
exercise are the difference in votes (liberal− conservador); difference in shares (liberal share
− conservador share); municipalities in which liberal vote was majority (strong liberal); and
municipalities in which conservador vote was majority (strong conservador). The results
are presented in Table 2.5. Ecological diversity is positively associated with the difference
in votes as well as the difference in shares (columns (1)-(4) in Table 2.5). Ecological di-
versity generates a positive difference in votes, that is, when liberal votes are greater than
conservador votes. This is an indication that when more ecological diversity generates more
inequality and higher probability of conflict, society expresses favoring those who advocate
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for less inequality.
Similar to previous results, ecological diversity is positively associated with the proba-
bility of liberal party obtaining majority and negatively associated with the probability of
conservador party obtaining majority (columns (5)-(8) in Table 2.5). As before, these results
are robust to the inclusion of historical variables (Table B.8).
These results are an indication of persistence in relationship between inequality and
conflict. Ecological diversity is a predictor of differences in shares in both elections analyzed
in the previous section. However, when we include the difference in the 1856 election in
a regression where the outcome variable is the difference in the 1958 election, ecological
diversity is not a significant predictor of it. The same applies when the outcome variable is
landholding inequality. These results are shown in Table 2.6.9
2.4. Conclusions
In this paper we present evidence of geographical roots of inequality and conflict. In
particular, we focus on the impact of ecological diversity, as a geographical variable that
positively impacts economic specialization, in particular trade (Fenske, 2014). This is the
first paper to overcome endogeneity problems that bias results previously found in this
literature. Besides, this exercise is performed at a subnational level, avoiding the problems
of unobserved heterogeneity present in cross country exercises.10
We find robust evidence between ecological diversity and land inequality and civil con-
flict in both 19th and 20th centuries. Ecological diversity seems to be a determining factor
to predict inequality and conflict, even after controlling for several other confounding geo-
graphical factors, as well as institutions (present of churches, financial, health and educative
institutions), sectorial composition of GDP, and historical variables (presence of Spaniards
and natives during the Conquest period and presence of slaves in 19th century).
9To make the results comparable, we restrict the sample to those municipalities we have information of
the 1856 elections for. This exercise is imperfect as we do not have information for inequality in 19th century
and the instrument approaches to become a weak instrument.
10Heterogeneity caused by differences in institutions, culture, among other factors.
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Finally, we explore the manifestation of political preferences as a potential transmission
channel of the relationship between inequality and conflict. We find robust evidence that
associates ecological diversity with having a positive difference between votes obtained by
liberal and conservador parties, as well as majority of votes obtained by each party.
These results suggest the existence of a positive link between ecological diversity, land
inequality and conflict as well as the persistence of inequality and conflict.
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Table 2.1. Ecological Diversity and Landholding Inequality
Inequality (Gini, 2005)
Landholding Inequality Landholder Inequality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ecological Diversity 0.28*** 0.25*** 0.24*** 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.13**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Absolute Latitude -0.10 -0.25 0.21 0.04
(0.29) (0.30) (0.36) (0.41)
Area -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Elevation 0.08 -0.49** -0.03 -0.64*
(0.13) (0.22) (0.12) (0.33)
Precipitation (mm/month) -0.15** -0.20*** -0.12* -0.14*
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Temperature (Daily Mean) 0.08 0.18 0.07 0.16
(0.13) (0.16) (0.12) (0.13)
Share of Area within 100kms of Sea -0.02 0.01
(0.09) (0.09)
Share of Area within 100kms of Perennial Water -1.48 -1.55*
(0.93) (0.77)




Coast Length 0.05* 0.04
(0.03) (0.04)
Pre-industrial Mobility (HMISea) -0.53** -0.65**
(0.22) (0.32)




Agricultural Suitability (Climatic) 0.03*** 0.02
(0.01) (0.01)
Agricultural Suitability (Climatic) (std) -0.11*** -0.17***
(0.02) (0.02)
Temperature Spatial Correlation -0.07 -0.01
(0.09) (0.10)
Temperature Volatility 0.19* 0.24**
(0.10) (0.09)
Average Crop Yield (pre-1500CE) -0.11** -0.08
(0.06) (0.07)
Average Crop Yield (pre-1500CE) (std) -0.04 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04)
Department FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.10
Observations 1091 1091 1091 1091 967 967 967 967
Notes: Standardized coefficients from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. Heteroskedasticity robust standard error
estimates clustered at the department level are reported in parentheses; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level,
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.4. Ecodiversity and La Violencia
La Violencia
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ecological Diversity 0.05 0.07 0.39** 0.41**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.16) (0.16)
Presence of Spaniards -0.13** -0.12***
(0.05) (0.04)
Presence of Natives -0.04 -0.08**
(0.05) (0.04)
Presence of Slaves -0.04 -0.07*
(0.03) (0.04)
Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical Contols Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical Controls Non Immediate Neighbors No No Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 0.04 0.06 -0.05 -0.04
Observations 1122 1122 1119 1119
Underidentification 0.000 0.000
Weak Identification 63.774 62.141
Notes: Standardized coefficients from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Instrumental
Variable (IV) regressions. Heteroskedasticity robust standard error estimates clustered
at the department level are reported in parentheses; *** denotes statistical significance
at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level, all for two-sided hypothesis
tests. Underidentification Test reports the p-value for the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk
statistic with rejection implying identification; F-stat reports the Kleibergen-Paap F




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.6. Ecological Diversity, Difference in Shares and Landholding Inequality
Difference in Shares - Liberal and Conservador
1856 1958 Landholding Inequality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ecological Diversity 1.07*** 0.61* 0.32 0.30 0.25 0.25
(0.36) (0.32) (0.31) (0.28) (0.26) (0.28)
Difference in Shares (Lib-Cons) 1856 0.27*** 0.04 -0.00
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Difference in Shares (Lib-Cons) 1958 0.15*** 0.15***
(0.05) (0.05)
Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Geographical Contols Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical Controls Non Immediate Neighbors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 -0.71 -0.07 0.14 0.16 0.19 0.19
Observations 564 564 564 564 564 564
Underidentification 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Weak Identification 16.507 16.507 13.746 13.746 13.588 12.537
Notes: Standardized coefficients from Instrumental Variable (IV) regression. Heteroskedasticity robust standard
error estimates clustered at the department level are reported in parentheses; *** denotes statistical significance
at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests. Underidentification
Test reports the p-value for the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk statistic with rejection implying identification; F-stat
reports the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic and Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic for weak identification.
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Chapter 3
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: CAUSAL RELATIONS
WITHIN NAFTA1
3.1. Introduction
Economists and policy makers consider the relation between international trade and
growth to be essential to economic development. The idea that trade generates growth has
been supported by theoretical and empirical research, which suggests that openness to trade
exposes domestic markets to foreign competition (Balassa, 1978), generates economies of
scale, especially in small economies (Helpman and Krugman, 1985), allows access to better
technologies and more capital (McKinnon, 1964), and promotes the diffusion of technologies
(Grossman and Helpman, 1991). All these channels boost economic growth. This is called
the export-led growth hypothesis.
Economic growth may also have positive impact on international trade via exports. Salva-
tore and Hatcher (1991) and Ghartey (1993) explain that productivity growth could increase
exports in a country where the degree of openness is low and with relatively abundant re-
sources. Furthermore Lancaster (1980) and Krugman (1984) show that relatively closed
economies with abundant resources may have incentives to trade even if tradable goods
are not produced based on comparative advantage. Kónya (2004) suggest that productiv-
ity gains via specialization could create better conditions to compete internationally thus
increase exports and ultimately generate growth. This is called the growth-driven exports
hypothesis.
1With Jesús Cañas (Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas). The views expressed in this chapter are those of
the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or the Federal
Reserve System. All errors are our own.
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Whether international trade causes economic growth or vice versa, countries chose differ-
ent directions when addressing international trade. One country may liberalize unilaterally
or negotiate preferential trade agreements. Even though unilateral reduction of tariffs is
considered the optimal decision to openness, few countries decide to follow this strategy.
Countries rather negotiate trade agreements. In the last years there has been a prolifera-
tion of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) over other options such as unilateral liberalization or
Custom Unions (CUs), although the last two strategies are superior in terms of welfare.2
Despite is not optimal in comparison with a unilateral liberalization or a CU, under
certain circumstances it is better to pursue a FTA. It can be politically viable (Facchini
et al., 2013) or may be preferable given the specific characteristics of the countries involved
in the trade negotiations (Lake, 2014b, 2017). The idea behind a preferential trade agreement
is that trade partners matter. The proliferation of FTAs during the last years can be a signal
of some particular interest of trading with specific countries.
This paper seeks to evaluate the relation between trade and growth considering countries
under a FTA. Specifically, we study the impact of trade within a free trade area versus
trade with the rest of the world on the FTA region’s economic growth. That is, we isolate
trade within a free trade area from trade with the rest of the world. In order to evaluate the
impact of trade within a FTA on economic growth and vice versa, we use data from the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) region and estimate a dynamic panel including
GDP, exports and imports. We perform a four-stage econometric procedure to identify the
causal effects of trade and growth (Haghnejad et al., 2014). First, we test the series for unit
root. Second, we evaluate if there is cointegration among variables and then estimate the
cointegration vector. Finally, we estimate a dynamic panel vector error correction model
(VEC) using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator proposed by Arellano
and Bover (1995), including the error corrector term, to account for endogeneity. Ultimately,
we estimate a dynamic panel using one equation at a time instead of taking into consideration
the whole system simultaneously to deal with the dimensionality dilemma.
2Krueger (1997) discusses the advantages of signing CUs over FTAs.
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Although the relation between trade and growth has been widely studied, this approach
has not yet been considered to the best of our knowledge. This framework explores not only
the relationship between trade and growth, but also allows for causal inference. If the main
objective of a FTA is to eliminate or reduce barriers to trade and increase specialization, we
expect that trade between members should have a bigger effect on growth than trade they
may have with the rest of the world.
Additionally to this introduction, the paper has five sections. Second section presents a
review of the literature in this area. We next present the data and then the methodology.
We finally present results and conclusions.
3.2. Literature Review
The export-led growth and growth-driven exports hypotheses have been tested in several
papers and using different methodologies. The empirical method most widely used is time
series techniques (Granger causality and cointegration) and the main characteristic of this
empirical literature is that the analysis is made only in one-country basis.
The basic empirical framework used to test both hypotheses is to take into account
production (GDP) and exports. Until 1980s, most of them are focused on correlation.3
Later the main idea was to analyze causality in Granger sense using bivariate models.
Jung and Marshall (1985) is one of the first attempts of using Granger causality between
exports and GDP, utilizing a sample of 37 developing countries. They present a comprehen-
sive summarize about what it had been done until 1984, where the common characteristic is
that all analyses are based on correlation. Although the export-led hypothesis is prevalent,
they also show that the results may vary across countries. Ghartey (1993) may be identified
as one of the first papers where stationarity is treated carefully and a vector autorregresive
model is estimated. He uses a sample of three countries and obtains results for the two
hypotheses. Dutt and Ghosh (1994, 1996) are papers where both cointegration and Granger
3For instance, Kavoussi (1984) calculates the Spearman rank correlation for seventy-three developing
countries to analyze the statistical dependence between exports and GDP.
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causality are explored. In Dutt and Ghosh (1994) is included a test of cointegration. How-
ever they do not test causality. Dutt and Ghosh (1996) integrate both concepts: they correct
by cointegration and then test causality.
Unlike previous work, Riezman et al. (1996) and Shan and Sun (1999) assure that the
results might be spurious if imports are excluded of the model. Riezman et al. (1996) use the
whole Summers-Heston data set. They find that for some countries the export-led growth
hypothesis applies, for some others the growth-driven exports and for others the causality is
in both directions.
Then several papers look at causality in Granger sense and use the methodology proposed
by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) and Dolado and Lütkepohl (1996).4 In general the results
show that causality can go in both directions or only in one (either from economic growth to
the growth rate of exports or vice versa). For big countries as US the most typical conclusion
is that causality goes from exports to GDP, whereas for small countries the causality goes
mainly from exports to GDP as well, although there are cases where GDP also causes exports
in Granger sense.5
For purposes of this paper, Zestos and Tao (2002) is important because they use Canadian
and US data, but yet considering only one-country basis analysis. They include GDP, exports
and imports in their empirical model. They find that Canadian GDP, exports and imports
are closely related and that causality is presented in either direction, whereas US exhibits a
weak relation between trade and growth. These results are in the same direction as most of
the results obtained in other empirical exercises.
There are relatively recent papers where the two hypotheses are still explored but fol-
lowing modern tools, in particular exploiting panel data framework. Yet they still work
4As it is mentioned in both Toda and Yamamoto (1995) and Dolado and Lütkepohl (1996), Wald tests
have asymptotic problems in presence of integrated series. So they propose a method where Wald tests are
valid and Granger causality can be studied when variables are not stationary.
5Giles and Williams (2000a,b) and Salykova (2012) present a comprehensive, extensive and detailed
literature review. Although there are several recent papers dealing with the two hypotheses considered in
this one, all of them follow the traditional methodology: one-country basis. The extensions are related with
the inclusion of new variables (for instance demand of electricity or tourism) but not with the inclusion of
more countries in the same framework.
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on a one-country basis.6 Hsiao and Hsiao (2006) perform both time series techniques and
panel data estimation. They include production, exports and foreign direct investment, FDI.
Although the results are diverse, as it is common in export-led and growth-driven exports
literature, they recognize that the identifications assumptions made in panel data allow them
to obtain superior results over the time series analysis as the parameters can be considered
as causal. However, they do not control for endogeneity and run regressions in all possible
directions. Won et al. (2008) use the same framework as Hsiao and Hsiao (2006) but from a
demand-side perspective. They do not control for endogeneity either. To avoid the problems
of cointegration in panel data with many years, they follow Toda and Yamamoto (1995)
methodology to analyze Granger causality.
Emirmahmutoglu and Kose (2011) perform meta analysis in mixed panels, analyzing the
finite sample properties of causality test via Monte Carlo experiments. They only use GDP
and exports and show results for OECD countries. They find evidence that supports the
export-led growth hypothesis for all countries.
Nasreen (2011) finds evidence of a cointegration relation among production and exports.
They find diverse evidence for both hypotheses. Although they take in consideration coin-
tegration, she does not solve the endogeneity problem.
Meanwhile Kılavuz and Topcu (2012) estimates a panel data considering GDP, invest-
ment, population, high and low-tech manufacturing industry exports and high and low-tech
manufacturing industry imports. They find that only high-tech manufacturing industry
exports, investment and low-tech manufacturing industry imports have a positive and sig-
nificant effect on growth. However, they did not deal with endogeneity problem.
Lastly Haghnejad et al. (2014) perform a four-stage econometric procedure to identify
the direction of causality. They test first if the series have unit root. Then check for the
existence of cointegrating relations. Third, they estimate the cointegration vector; and four,
they estimate a panel VEC using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator in
6This is important for our empirical exercise where we include three countries in the same framework to
deal with the curse of dimensionality originated by the fact that if all countries are included in the VEC
model, there is no enough degrees of freedom.
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order to consider that the parameters are causal, since they solve the endogeneity problem
following Arellano and Bover (1995).
3.3. Data
We use data from NAFTA countries which has been active since 1994. This agreement
was signed by Canada, Mexico and United States and it can be considered as a step forward
to the agreement signed in 1987 by Canada and US. This agreement is one of the first mul-
tilateral FTAs where two developed economies free trade with an emerging economy (Lake,
2014b, 2017). Data for GDP, total exports and imports are taken from the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and Haver Analytics from 1960 to 2013.
The values are in constant 2005 US dollars with annual frequency. For country specific ex-
ports, we used Direction of Trade data from the International Monetary Fund (DT-IMF)
and Haver Analytics.
As Dutt and Ghosh (1996) argue, the relation between exports (international trade) and
GDP implies dynamic effects that are accounted not only in the short run but also, and
most important, in the long run. The evolution of variables is shown in Figures C.1 and C.3
(Appendix C), where we are showing GDP, total exports and imports in levels without any
transformation. We are also showing the evolution of country specific exports in Figure C.4.
It can be seen that the commercial relation between Mexico and Canada is not so important,
even after NAFTA. The participations of exports from Canada to Mexico are around 0.4%
on average before 1994 and 0.7% with NAFTA. In the same way, the shares of exports from
Mexico to Canada are 1.4% and 2.3% respectively. Trade with US is far more important for
Canada and Mexico. The share of total exports from Canada to US is 66% before NAFTA
and 82% after NAFTA. For Mexico those values are 62% and 84%. For US the trade with
each of those two countries is important, but not as much as it is for Canada and Mexico.
The shares are 20.5% and 21.5% to Canada and 5.2% and 12% to Mexico, respectively. What
it is clear is that the shares of exports to US from both Canada and Mexico and from US to
Mexico changed dramatically with the free trade agreement.
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3.4. Methodology
We estimate a dynamic panel data of the whole bloc, following Arellano and Bover
(1995).7 This alternative is used in models where the coefficient of the lagged endogenous
variable is likely close to 1 (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Baltagi, 2013). The reduce form we
estimate has the same structure in comparison with that from the time series literature,
that is each equation has an endogenous variable which depends upon its own lags and the
lags of the other variables plus the term that capture the likely long-run relationship among
variables, i.e the error correction term. The empirical model is described as following:
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where ECTz is the error correction term and we assume that country fixed effects are included




it, for z =
{y, x,m}, y is GDP, x is exports, and m is imports. The exports and imports within the
free trade area for country i are xi and mi, respectively. Exports to and imports from
the rest of the world for country i are represented by xiw and miw. All variables are in
7Roodman (2006) and Baltagi (2013) presents a comprehensive explanation of GMM systems and its
implementation.
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logarithms and each equation is in first differences. We also include time fixed effects to
capture particularities of each year included in the sample.
We perform a four-stage econometric procedure. The aim is to identify properly the causal
effects. First, we run the Im-Pesaram-Shin panel unit root test.8 If the series are integrated,
we then evaluate if exists a cointegrating relation among variables. To do that, we carry out
the Pedroni panel cointegrating test (Baltagi, 2013, ch. 12). If some cointegrating relation
is found, it is necessary to estimate the cointegrating relations, which is performed using
the panel fully modified ordinary least squares, based on Pedroni methodology described
in Baltagi (2013). Lastly, we estimate a dynamic panel data model for each equation and
then we test causality using Wald tests. If the series are not cointegrated, we skip the third
stage and in the fourth one we estimate a dynamic panel model without including the error
correction term. The number of lags is decided according to SIC.
A potential problem of using Arellano and Bover (1995) methodology is related with
number of countries employed in the empirical exercise. We have a small N and a big T ,
and as Soto (2009) points out, the properties of estimators as proposed by Arellano and
Bover (1995) are not well known when the number of individuals (in this case countries) is
small, i.e. when N is small. However, as it is also explained by Soto (2009), the system
generalized method of moments estimator has a lower bias and higher efficiency that others.
In that sense, although it is preferable to have a higher N , for the purposes of the paper,
the methodology pursued to estimate the empirical model is convenient and can shed light
about the causality of trade and growth within NAFTA.
3.5. Results
We propose a new framework in order to test the two hypotheses considered in this paper:
the export-led growth and the growth-driven exports. The idea is to work with a dynamic
panel data framework and follow Arellano and Bover (1995) methodology. The advantage of
this methodology is that we may obtain conclusions about causality since the right hand side
8We also run the Levin-Lin-Chu test as a robustness check (see Baltagi, 2013, ch. 12)
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being endogenous is instrumented with lags of the variables in levels.9 We also discriminate
trade within the bloc from trade with the rest of the world. We estimate equations (3.1),
(3.2) and (3.3) separately.10
Table 3.1 summarizes the results for GDP equation. What we find is that the export-led
growth hypothesis does not hold for the period 1994-2013, though so it does for the other
specifications: 1960-1993, and the whole period with and without nafta as a dummy.
Regarding the long-run impact, we calculate it assuming steady state and solving for the
variable we are interested in. For instance, in GDP equation the long run impact of exports
is represented by the equation δy,LR =
δy1+δy2
1−βy1−βy2 . This long-run effect is not significant either
for 1994-2013, but it is positive a significant for the other three specifications. Comparing
with the exports to the rest of the world (µy,LR), there is evidence to conclude that it was
significant for the period in which NAFTA has been active and is negative for the other
three specifications. Finally, we test if the two coefficients are statistically different. They
are different but not for the period 1994-2013.
With respect to imports, we find similar conclusions, although the long run coefficients
for trade within bloc and with the rest of the world are not statistically different.
The results for the second hypothesis are summarized in Table 3.2. Production is sig-
nificant in the short-run in all specifications and the long run coefficients is significant only
for period 1960-1993. With respect to imports, the short run impact is significant in all
specifications but in the period 1994-2013, as wells as the long run coefficient. Notice that
the impact is positive, indicating that imports are source of enhanced exports.
Given the model estimated, it is possible to analyze two additional hypotheses: the
growth-driven imports and the exports-driven imports for the free trade area. The results
are presented in Table 3.3. We find that the first hypothesis does not hold and the long run
effect is significant only for the whole period (with and without nafta dummy). Exports are
9According to SIC, we should include two lags in the model.
10We may follow this methodology as, first, series are I(1), according to the unit root test for panel
performed in Stata; and second, the variables are not cointegrated according to the panel cointegration test
using pedroni in Stata (Neal, 2014). Therefore we may estimate a dynamic panel without correcting by
cointegration. In this sense, the model is not misspecified (Baltagi, 2013; Haghnejad et al., 2014).
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significant in the short-run but are not important for imports within the area in the long
run.
3.6. Conclusions
In this paper we use information from Canada, Mexico and US to test two hypotheses
that are common in the growth-trade literature: export-led growth or growth-driven exports.
We present evidence about causality in Granger sense of international trade and economic
growth. We replicate what has been done in the literature, that is, we perform Granger
causality and analyze cointegration in a one-country basis. The results obtained in this first
empirical exercise are on the same line of the literature.11
We extend the traditional analysis proposing an empirical framework that allows us to
evaluate those hypothesis in a wider framework. Since in the last twenty years countries
have signed several free trade agreements with other partners, we consider that the same
empirical framework may be used to assess whether trade within trade blocs is important
for economic growth. We use a dynamic panel to estimate the causality of intra bloc exports
and imports on economic growth and vice versa. We do not find evidence to conclude
convincingly that export-led growth or growth-driven exports hold within the NAFTA region.
More analysis must be done in order to get conclusive evidence regarding the growth-driven
exports hypothesis within NAFTA and also to investigate the structural reasons for the weak
results. For instance, it would be important to look at the degree of complementarity and
substitution between exports and domestic production given product sharing between US
and Mexican manufacturing firms as well as between US and Canadian factories.
The main contribution of this paper is that with this empirical strategy is possible to test
causality between growth and trade considering solely the trade bloc under an specific FTA.
This might help to evaluate the impact of the intra-bloc trade on economic growth and vice
versa.
11The results are presented in Appendix C.
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This paper may be extended by looking at specific regions within the trade bloc. For
example, trade between the south of the US and the north of Mexico is significantly more
important.
Table 3.1. GDP equation
Endogenous variable: ∆ly (1) (2) (3) (4)
Exports NAFTA
Short Run: Ho : ∆lxt−1 = 0,∆lxt−2 = 0 no 1% 1% 1%
Long Run: δy,LR −0.013 0.212 0.105 0.105
Ho : δy,LR = 0 no 1% 5% 5%
Exports Rest of the World
Short Run: Ho : ∆lxw,t−1 = 0,∆lxw,t−2 = 0 1% no 1% 1%
Long Run: µy,LR 0.049 −0.12 −0.04 −0.04
Ho : µy,LR = 0 5% 1% 1% 1%
Ho : δy,LR = µy,LR no 1% 1% 1%
Imports NAFTA
Ho : ∆lmt−1 = 0,∆lmt−2 = 0 1% 1% 1% 1%
γy,LR 0.0004 −0.097 0.032 0.032
Ho : γy,LR = 0 no no no no
Imports Rest of the World
Short Run: Ho : ∆lmw,t−1 = 0,∆lmw,t−2 = 0 5% 1% no no
Long Run: ρy,LR −0.03 0.084 0.014 0.014
Ho : ρy,LR = 0 5% 5% no no
Ho : γy,LR = ρy,LR no no no no
Sargan overidentification test no reject no reject no reject no reject
Time fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Note: Robust standard errors. (1): post-1994 (2): pre-1994, (3): whole sample (4): with a dummy
capturing nafta
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Table 3.2. Exports to NAFTA equation
Endogenous variable: ∆lx (1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP NAFTA
Short Run: Ho : ∆lyt−1 = 0,∆lyt−2 = 0 1% 1% 1% 1%
Long Run: βx,LR −2.53 0.643 0.411 0.411
Ho : βx,LR = 0 no 1% no no
Imports NAFTA
Short Run: Ho : ∆lmt−1 = 0,∆lmt−2 = 0 no 1% 1% 1%
Short Run: γx,LR 0.301 0.285 0.41 0.41
Ho : γx,LR = 0 no 1% 1% 1%
Sargan overidentification test no reject no reject no reject no reject
Time fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Note: Robust standard errors. (1): post-1994 (2): pre-1994, (3): whole sample (4): with a
dummy capturing nafta
Table 3.3. Imports from NAFTA equation
Endogenous variable: ∆lm (1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP NAFTA
Short Run: Ho : ∆lyt−1 = 0,∆lyt−2 = 0 1% 1% 1% 1%
Long Run: βm,LR −12.21 −0.06 −1.09 −1.09
Ho : βm,LR = 0 no no 10% 10%
Exports NAFTA
Short Run: Ho : ∆lxt−1 = 0,∆lxt−2 = 0 no 1% 1% 1%
Long Run: δm,LR −0.55 0.28 0.187 0.187
Ho : δm,LR = 0 no no no no
Sargan overidentification test no reject no reject no reject no reject
Time fixed effects yes yes yes yes




THE EFFECT OF QUALITY OF EDUCATION ON CRIME: EVIDENCE FROM
COLOMBIA
Figure A.1. Crime Rate 2007
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Figure A.2. Education Quality 2007
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Figure A.3. Crime Rate 2013
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Table A.2. Crime and Education Quality (Without Bogota)
Crime
Crime Property Crime Violent Crime
(1) (2) (3)
Average Score in Subjects -5.73*** -6.05*** 0.24
(2.00) (2.17) (0.98)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Trend Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 -2.62 -2.89 -0.19
Observations 4486 4491 6134
Underidentification 0.011 0.011 0.001
Weak Identification 24.198 24.125 22.439
Overidentification 0.472 0.575 0.816
Notes: Standardized coefficients from Instrumental Variable (IV) regression.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard error estimates clustered at municipality level
are reported in parentheses; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level,
** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
Underidentification Test reports the p-value for the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk
statistic with rejection implying identification; F-stat reports the Kleibergen-
Paap F statistic and Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic for weak identification;
Overidentification test reports the p-value for the Hansen J statistic with the
null being that the instruments are jointly valid.
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Table A.3. Disaggregated Crime and Education Quality (Without Bogota)
Car Commerce Household Person Kidnap. Pol. Kidnap. Non Pol. Kidnap. Homid.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Average Score in Subjects -6.32*** 0.69 0.07 -3.64 -3.27** -0.23 -4.56** 0.69
(2.16) (1.21) (0.85) (2.68) (1.59) (0.82) (2.10) (1.02)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 -1.75 -0.21 -0.19 -1.50 -0.51 -0.19 -0.83 -0.22
Observations 4586 5962 6036 6130 6213 6213 6213 6134
Underidentification 0.013 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Weak Identification 20.330 22.125 22.376 22.590 22.610 22.610 22.610 22.439
Overidentification 0.568 0.190 0.210 0.291 0.531 0.821 0.483 0.987
Notes: Standardized coefficients from Instrumental Variable (IV) regression. Heteroskedasticity robust standard error estimates
clustered at municipality level are reported in parentheses; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level,
and * at the 10% level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests. Underidentification Test reports the p-value for the Kleibergen-Paap (2006)
rk statistic with rejection implying identification; F-stat reports the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic and Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic
for weak identification; Overidentification test reports the p-value for the Hansen J statistic with the null being that the instruments
are jointly valid.
Table A.4. Crime and Education Quality (Without State Capitals)
Crime Property Crime Violent Crime
(1) (2) (3)
Average Score in Subjects -3.60*** -3.87*** 0.32
(1.31) (1.48) (0.99)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Trend Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 -0.94 -1.02 -0.20
Observations 4324 4329 5954
Underidentification 0.016 0.016 0.004
Weak Identification 15.755 15.708 18.554
Overidentification 0.210 0.260 0.875
Notes: Standardized coefficients from Instrumental Variable (IV) regression.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard error estimates clustered at municipality
level are reported in parentheses; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1%
level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level, all for two-sided hypothe-
sis tests. Underidentification Test reports the p-value for the Kleibergen-Paap
(2006) rk statistic with rejection implying identification; F-stat reports the
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic and Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic for weak iden-
tification; Overidentification test reports the p-value for the Hansen J statistic
with the null being that the instruments are jointly valid.
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Table A.5. Disaggregated Crime and Education Quality (Without State Capitals)
Car Commerce Household Person Kidnap. Pol. Kidnap. Non Pol. Kidnap. Homid.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Average Score in Subjects -5.33* -0.11 0.43 -0.73 -3.44* -0.29 -4.74** 0.80
(2.89) (1.09) (0.93) (0.86) (1.81) (0.92) (2.34) (1.03)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 -1.18 -0.17 -0.20 -0.21 -0.54 -0.19 -0.87 -0.23
Observations 4424 5782 5856 5950 6033 6033 6033 5954
Underidentification 0.018 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
Weak Identification 13.057 18.201 17.686 18.296 18.667 18.667 18.667 18.554
Overidentification 0.461 0.228 0.187 0.128 0.523 0.872 0.479 0.955
Notes: Standardized coefficients from Instrumental Variable (IV) regression. Heteroskedasticity robust standard error estimates
clustered at municipality level are reported in parentheses; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level,
and * at the 10% level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests. Underidentification Test reports the p-value for the Kleibergen-Paap
(2006) rk statistic with rejection implying identification; F-stat reports the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic and Cragg-Donald Wald
F statistic for weak identification; Overidentification test reports the p-value for the Hansen J statistic with the null being that
the instruments are jointly valid.
Table A.6. Violence and Education Quality (With Population <200,000 Inhabitants)
Crime
Violence Property Crime Violent Crime
(1) (2) (3)
Average Score in Subjects -3.67*** -3.90*** 0.32
(1.27) (1.41) (0.99)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Trend Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 -0.99 -1.07 -0.20
Observations 4336 4341 5984
Underidentification 0.015 0.015 0.004
Weak Identification 15.896 15.847 18.556
Overidentification 0.221 0.274 0.882
Notes: Standardized coefficients from Instrumental Variable (IV) regression. Het-
eroskedasticity robust standard error estimates clustered at municipality level are
reported in parentheses; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, **
at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests. Under-
identification Test reports the p-value for the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk statistic
with rejection implying identification; F-stat reports the Kleibergen-Paap F statis-
tic and Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic for weak identification; Overidentification
test reports the p-value for the Hansen J statistic with the null being that the
instruments are jointly valid.
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Table A.7. Disaggregated Crime and Education Quality (With Population < 200, 000 In-
habitants)
Car Commerce Household Person Kidnap. Pol. Kidnap. Non Pol. Kidnap. Homid.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Average Score in Subjects -5.47* -0.14 0.31 -0.74 -3.42* -0.24 -4.76** 0.79
(2.97) (1.07) (0.88) (0.84) (1.80) (0.92) (2.34) (1.04)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 -1.20 -0.17 -0.19 -0.21 -0.54 -0.19 -0.88 -0.23
Observations 4436 5812 5886 5980 6063 6063 6063 5984
Underidentification 0.017 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
Weak Identification 13.200 18.215 17.679 18.289 18.668 18.668 18.668 18.556
Overidentification 0.467 0.234 0.194 0.130 0.520 0.850 0.473 0.949
Notes: Standardized coefficients from Instrumental Variable (IV) regression. Heteroskedasticity robust standard error estimates
clustered at municipality level are reported in parentheses; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level,
and * at the 10% level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests. Underidentification Test reports the p-value for the Kleibergen-Paap
(2006) rk statistic with rejection implying identification; F-stat reports the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic and Cragg-Donald Wald F
statistic for weak identification; Overidentification test reports the p-value for the Hansen J statistic with the null being that the
instruments are jointly valid.
Table A.8. Crime and Education Quality (Rural Areas)
Violence Property Crime Violent Crime
(1) (2) (3)
Average Score in Subjects -4.16* -5.48** 0.87
(2.38) (2.62) (1.12)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Trend Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 -0.87 -1.34 -0.24
Observations 2588 2588 3961
Underidentification 0.001 0.001 0.018
Weak Identification 10.409 10.409 11.827
Overidentification 0.288 0.454 0.932
Notes: Standardized coefficients from Instrumental Variable (IV) regression. Het-
eroskedasticity robust standard error estimates clustered at municipality level are
reported in parentheses; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, **
at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests. Under-
identification Test reports the p-value for the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk statistic
with rejection implying identification; F-stat reports the Kleibergen-Paap F statis-
tic and Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic for weak identification; Overidentification
test reports the p-value for the Hansen J statistic with the null being that the
instruments are jointly valid.
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Table A.9. Disaggregated Crime and Education Quality (Rural Areas)
Car Commerce Household Person Kidnap. Pol. Kidnap. Non Pol. Kidnap. Homid.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Average Score in Subjects -5.84 0.45 1.95 -0.80 -4.01 -0.68 -4.48* 1.43
(3.93) (1.52) (1.35) (1.53) (2.53) (1.67) (2.67) (1.17)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 -1.07 -0.19 -0.33 -0.22 -0.65 -0.20 -0.76 -0.31
Observations 2668 3805 3858 3946 4029 4029 4029 3961
Underidentification 0.002 0.018 0.011 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.018
Weak Identification 9.245 11.418 12.650 11.263 11.791 11.791 11.791 11.827
Overidentification 0.472 0.240 0.242 0.293 0.672 0.803 0.576 0.968
Notes: Standardized coefficients from Instrumental Variable (IV) regression. Heteroskedasticity robust standard error estimates
clustered at municipality level are reported in parentheses; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level,
and * at the 10% level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests. Underidentification Test reports the p-value for the Kleibergen-Paap
(2006) rk statistic with rejection implying identification; F-stat reports the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic and Cragg-Donald Wald F
statistic for weak identification; Overidentification test reports the p-value for the Hansen J statistic with the null being that the
instruments are jointly valid.
Table A.10. Crime and Education Quality (Urban Areas)
Violence Property Crime Violent Crime
(1) (2) (3)
Average Score in Subjects -1.67 -1.10 -2.41***
(1.45) (1.41) (0.72)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Trend Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 -0.50 -0.26 -0.92
Observations 1893 1897 2165
Underidentification 0.500 0.501 0.319
Weak Identification 18.799 18.566 24.835
Overidentification 0.799 0.718 0.111
Notes: Standardized coefficients from Instrumental Variable (IV) regression. Het-
eroskedasticity robust standard error estimates clustered at municipality level are
reported in parentheses; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, **
at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests. Under-
identification Test reports the p-value for the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk statistic
with rejection implying identification; F-stat reports the Kleibergen-Paap F statis-
tic and Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic for weak identification; Overidentification
test reports the p-value for the Hansen J statistic with the null being that the
instruments are jointly valid.
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Table A.11. Disaggregated Crime and Education Quality (Urban Areas)
Car Commerce Household Person Kidnap. Pol. Kidnap. Non Pol. Kidnap. Homid.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Average Score in Subjects -2.03 -0.94 -1.06 -0.54 0.71 0.91 -0.39 -2.54***
(1.43) (0.63) (0.97) (1.43) (1.27) (0.63) (2.64) (0.76)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 -0.57 -0.23 -0.28 -0.17 -0.23 -0.25 -0.20 -1.04
Observations 1912 2148 2169 2175 2175 2175 2175 2165
Underidentification 0.497 0.333 0.458 0.318 0.318 0.318 0.318 0.319
Weak Identification 18.973 24.340 23.947 24.692 24.692 24.692 24.692 24.835
Overidentification 0.492 0.127 0.155 0.267 0.313 0.560 0.343 0.044
Notes: Standardized coefficients from Instrumental Variable (IV) regression. Heteroskedasticity robust standard error estimates
clustered at municipality level are reported in parentheses; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level,
and * at the 10% level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests. Underidentification Test reports the p-value for the Kleibergen-Paap (2006)
rk statistic with rejection implying identification; F-stat reports the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic and Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic
for weak identification; Overidentification test reports the p-value for the Hansen J statistic with the null being that the instruments
are jointly valid.
Table A.12. Crime and Education Quality (Total Transfers as Instruments)
Crime Rate
Crime Property Crime Violent Crime
(1) (2) (3)
Average Score in Subjects -2.19 -2.76** 1.05
(1.38) (1.41) (1.16)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Trend Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 -0.49 -0.67 -0.26
Observations 4642 4647 6390
Underidentification 0.001 0.001 0.001
Weak Identification 23.106 23.101 15.720
Overidentification 0.053 0.088 0.127
Notes: Standardized coefficients from Instrumental Variable (IV) regression. Het-
eroskedasticity robust standard error estimates clustered at municipality level are
reported in parentheses; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, **
at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests. Under-
identification Test reports the p-value for the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk statistic
with rejection implying identification; F-stat reports the Kleibergen-Paap F statis-
tic and Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic for weak identification; Overidentification
test reports the p-value for the Hansen J statistic with the null being that the
instruments are jointly valid.
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Table A.13. Disaggregated Crime and Education Quality (Total Transfers as Instruments)
Crime Rate
Car Commerce Household Person Kidnap. Pol. Kidnap. Non Pol. Kidnap. Homid.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Average Score in Subjects -3.14 -0.27 0.03 -1.76 -2.84 0.18 -4.44 1.46
(2.22) (1.04) (0.65) (2.22) (2.09) (0.86) (3.12) (1.22)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 -0.57 -0.17 -0.19 -0.46 -0.43 -0.19 -0.79 -0.32
Observations 4754 6183 6274 6380 6469 6469 6469 6390
Underidentification 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Weak Identification 13.591 16.427 23.803 16.888 15.978 15.978 15.978 15.720
Overidentification 0.082 0.912 0.106 0.208 0.279 0.232 0.588 0.089
Notes: Standardized coefficients from Instrumental Variable (IV) regression. Heteroskedasticity robust standard error estimates
clustered at municipality level are reported in parentheses; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level,
and * at the 10% level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests. Underidentification Test reports the p-value for the Kleibergen-Paap
(2006) rk statistic with rejection implying identification; F-stat reports the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic and Cragg-Donald Wald F
statistic for weak identification; Overidentification test reports the p-value for the Hansen J statistic with the null being that the
instruments are jointly valid.
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Table A.14. Crime and Education Quality (Total Transfers as an Additional Regressor)
Violence Property Crime Violent Crime
(1) (2) (3)
Average Score in Subjects -9.62** -9.50** -0.97
(4.10) (4.19) (1.27)
Per Capita Total Transfers 0.21 0.18 0.09
(0.14) (0.13) (0.06)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Trend Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 -7.27 -7.08 -0.25
Observations 4486 4491 6134
Underidentification 0.056 0.056 0.016
Weak Identification 6.739 6.671 14.352
Overidentification 0.454 0.533 0.213
Notes: Standardized coefficients from Instrumental Variable (IV) regression. Het-
eroskedasticity robust standard error estimates clustered at municipality level are
reported in parentheses; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, **
at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests. Under-
identification Test reports the p-value for the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk statistic
with rejection implying identification; F-stat reports the Kleibergen-Paap F statis-
tic and Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic for weak identification; Overidentification
test reports the p-value for the Hansen J statistic with the null being that the












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.16. Crime and Education Quality (Total Transfers instead of Total Expenditures)
Crime Property Crime Violent Crime
(1) (2) (3)
Average Score in Subjects -1.53 -1.89 0.71
(1.29) (1.29) (1.51)
Per Capita Total Transfers -0.05 -0.06 0.02
(0.08) (0.07) (0.05)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Trend Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 -0.31 -0.38 -0.22
Observations 4642 4647 6390
Underidentification 0.023 0.023 0.023
Weak Identification 4.837 4.811 6.638
Overidentification 0.042 0.075 0.118
Notes: Standardized coefficients from Instrumental Variable (IV) regression.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard error estimates clustered at municipality
level are reported in parentheses; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1%
level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level, all for two-sided hypothesis
tests. Underidentification Test reports the p-value for the Kleibergen-Paap
(2006) rk statistic with rejection implying identification; F-stat reports the
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic and Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic for weak iden-
tification; Overidentification test reports the p-value for the Hansen J statistic

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.18. Crime and Education Quality (Total Transfers Instrumented)
Crime Property Crime Violent Crime
(1) (2) (3)
Average Score in Subjects 0.70 0.00 1.79
(1.66) (1.48) (1.47)
Total Transfers 0.34*** 0.32*** 0.15
(0.06) (0.06) (0.19)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Trend Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 -0.23 -0.15 -0.39
Observations 4486 4491 6117
Underidentification 0.140 0.140 0.077
Weak Identification 2.965 2.966 4.983
Overidentification 0.005 0.014 0.364
Notes: Standardized coefficients from Instrumental Variable (IV) regression. Het-
eroskedasticity robust standard error estimates clustered at municipality level are
reported in parentheses; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, **
at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests. Under-
identification Test reports the p-value for the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk statistic
with rejection implying identification; F-stat reports the Kleibergen-Paap F statis-
tic and Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic for weak identification; Overidentification
test reports the p-value for the Hansen J statistic with the null being that the

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.20. Crime and Education Quality (Cognitive Areas)
Violence Property Crime Violent Crime
(1) (2) (3)
Average Score in Cognitive Areas -11.77*** -12.28*** 0.30
(3.44) (3.70) (1.24)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Trend Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 -13.45 -14.64 -0.20
Observations 4486 4491 6134
Underidentification 0.032 0.031 0.019
Weak Identification 11.530 11.618 7.805
Overidentification 0.845 0.981 0.814
Notes: Standardized coefficients from Instrumental Variable (IV) regression. Het-
eroskedasticity robust standard error estimates clustered at municipality level are re-
ported in parentheses; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the
5% level, and * at the 10% level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests. Underidentification
Test reports the p-value for the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk statistic with rejection im-
plying identification; F-stat reports the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic and Cragg-Donald
Wald F statistic for weak identification; Overidentification test reports the p-value for



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.22. Crime and Education Quality (Social Areas)
Violence Property Crime Violent Crime
(1) (2) (3)
Average Score in Social Areas -3.22*** -3.41*** 0.15
(1.01) (1.11) (0.60)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Trend Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 -1.73 -1.91 -0.20
Observations 4486 4491 6134
Underidentification 0.013 0.013 0.001
Weak Identification 26.346 26.251 25.864
Overidentification 0.408 0.495 0.821
Notes: Standardized coefficients from Instrumental Variable (IV) regression. Het-
eroskedasticity robust standard error estimates clustered at municipality level are
reported in parentheses; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at
the 5% level, and * at the 10% level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests. Under-
identification Test reports the p-value for the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk statistic
with rejection implying identification; F-stat reports the Kleibergen-Paap F statis-
tic and Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic for weak identification; Overidentification
test reports the p-value for the Hansen J statistic with the null being that the























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.24. Crime and Education Quality (Total Score)
Violence Property Crime Violent Crime
(1) (2) (3)
Total Score -0.60*** -0.64*** 0.05
(0.21) (0.23) (0.21)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Trend Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 -0.48 -0.51 -0.19
Observations 4486 4491 6134
Underidentification 0.003 0.003 0.007
Weak Identification 18.026 18.031 9.135
Overidentification 0.189 0.223 0.811
Notes: Standardized coefficients from Instrumental Variable (IV) regres-
sion. Heteroskedasticity robust standard error estimates clustered at
municipality level are reported in parentheses; *** denotes statistical
significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level,
all for two-sided hypothesis tests. Underidentification Test reports the p-
value for the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk statistic with rejection implying
identification; F-stat reports the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic and Cragg-
Donald Wald F statistic for weak identification; Overidentification test
reports the p-value for the Hansen J statistic with the null being that
the instruments are jointly valid.
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Table A.25. Disaggregated Crime and Education Quality (Total Score)
Car Commerce Household Person Kidnap. Pol. Kidnap. Non Pol. Kidnap. Homid.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total Score -0.70** 0.13 0.00 -0.75 -0.69* -0.05 -0.96* 0.14
(0.27) (0.23) (0.15) (0.52) (0.35) (0.17) (0.50) (0.21)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 -0.41 -0.18 -0.19 -0.80 -0.33 -0.19 -0.48 -0.20
Observations 4586 5962 6036 6130 6213 6213 6213 6134
Underidentification 0.007 0.006 0.003 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
Weak Identification 13.668 8.966 13.095 9.203 9.065 9.065 9.065 9.135
Overidentification 0.290 0.188 0.218 0.270 0.553 0.809 0.514 0.971
Notes: Standardized coefficients from Instrumental Variable (IV) regression. Heteroskedasticity robust standard error esti-
mates clustered at municipality level are reported in parentheses; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at
the 5% level, and * at the 10% level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests. Underidentification Test reports the p-value for the
Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk statistic with rejection implying identification; F-stat reports the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic and
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic for weak identification; Overidentification test reports the p-value for the Hansen J statistic
with the null being that the instruments are jointly valid.
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Appendix B
ECOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF LAND INEQUALITY, POLITICAL PREFERENCES,
AND CONFLICT
Figure B.1. Ecological Zones
Ecological Zones
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Figure B.2. Ecological Diversity
Ecological Diversity
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Ecological Diversity
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Table B.1. Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Landholding Inequality 0.688 0.112 0 0.982 1091
Landholder Inequality 0.708 0.104 0 0.977 967
Ecological Diversity 0.141 0.191 0 0.726 1122
Average Crop Yield (pre-1500CE) 3192.597 698.425 0 5069.166 1122
Average Crop Yield (pre-1500CE) (std) 351.868 295.667 0 1356.361 1122
Absolute Latitude 5.638 2.572 0.062 13.356 1122
Area 1013.819 3183.373 15.381 65185.195 1122
Elevation 1317.597 989.790 0 3658.771 1122
Precipitation (mm/month) 167.891 76.77 41.361 602.379 1122
Temperature (Daily Mean) 20.654 4.932 10.955 28.491 1122
Share of Area within 100kms of Sea 0.19 0.379 0 1 1122
Share of Area within 100kms of Perennial Water 0.998 0.042 0 1 1122
Share of Area within 100kms of Fluctuating Water 0.008 0.087 0 1 1122
Ruggedness 201.723 140.957 0 810.322 1122
Coast Length 1.78 17.786 0 451.89 1122
Pre-industrial Mobility (HMISea) 0.299 0.057 0 0.46 1122
Pre-industrial Mobility (HMISea) (std) 0.06 0.037 0 0.565 1122
Malaria 1.503 2.1 0 7.372 1122
Agricultural Suitability (Climatic) 0.995 0.06 0 1 1122
Agricultural Suitability (Climatic) (std) 0.001 0.008 0 0.231 1122
Temperature Spatial Correlation 0.845 0.235 0 0.995 1122
Temperature Volatility 0.504 0.064 0.225 0.783 1122
Presence of Catholic Church 2.088 10.686 0 305 1065
Presence of Non Catholic Church 2.166 11.154 0 317 1065
Presence of Agrarian Bank 1.806 9.15 0 264 1065
Presence of Financial Institutions 1.723 8.845 0 252 1065
Presence of Other Financial Institutions 0.321 1.78 0 47 1065
Presence of Hospitals and Clinics 0.801 4.102 0 117 1065
Presence of Healt Care Facilities 0.583 3.033 0 85 1065
Presence of Minor Health Care Facilities 0.741 3.914 0 108 1065
Presence of Public Libraries 1.025 5.208 0 150 1065
Total Number of Institutions 35.409 180.794 0 5176 1065
Total Public Schools 40.081 43.715 0 767.278 1122
Total Private Schools 10.626 86.794 0 2395.556 1122
Total Middle Schools 9.654 50.054 0 1400.222 1122
Distance to State Capital 81.458 60.565 0 493.084 1122
Distance to Country Capital 321.553 194.64 0 1270.85 1122
Distance to Major Wholesale Market 129.975 111.561 0 926.467 1122
Distance to Secondary Wholesale Market 68.743 102.481 0 913.217 1122
Rural Population Share 0.594 0.238 0.002 1 1122
Agricultural Share of GDP 0.259 0.191 0 0.893 1097
Industrial Share of GDP 0.252 0.162 0.008 0.893 1097
Services Share of GDP 0.416 0.168 0.005 0.876 1097
Presence of Spaniards 0.367 0.482 0 1 1122
Presence of Natives 0.404 0.491 0 1 1122
Presence of Slaves 0.396 0.489 0 1 1130
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Table B.2. Ecological Diversity and Landholding Inequality - Accounting for Institutions
Land Inequality (Gini, 2005)
Benchmark Religious Financial Health Human Capital
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ecological Diversity 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.19*** 0.19***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Presence of Catholic Church 0.03
(0.04)
Presence of Non Catholic Church 0.10**
(0.05)
Presence of Agrarian Bank -0.09**
(0.04)
Presence of Financial Institutions 0.20***
(0.04)
Presence of Other Financial Institutions -0.01
(0.03)
Presence of Hospitals and Clinics 0.10***
(0.03)
Presence of Health Care Facilities 0.01
(0.04)
Presence of Minor Health Care Facilities 0.03
(0.03)
Total Number of Institutions 0.12***
(0.03)
Presence of Public Libraries 0.09***
(0.02)
Total Public Schools 0.10**
(0.04)
Total Private Schools 0.07
(0.04)
Total Middle Schools 0.13***
(0.03)
Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical Contols Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.15




Notes: Standardized coefficients from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. Heteroskedasticity robust standard
error estimates clustered at the department level are reported in parentheses; *** denotes statistical significance at the
1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table B.3. Ecological Diversity and Landholding Inequality - Sectoral Composition and
Market Access
Landholding Inequality (Gini, 2005)
Benchmark Market Access Sectorial Composition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ecological Diversity 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.21***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Distance to State Capital -0.14**
(0.06)
Distance to Country Capital 0.15
(0.22)
Distance to Major Wholesale Market -0.01
(0.12)
Distance to Secondary Wholesale Market -0.06
(0.12)
Rural Population Share -0.16***
(0.05)
Agricultural Share of GDP -0.09**
(0.03)
Industrial Share of GDP -0.02
(0.05)
Services Share of GDP 0.12**
(0.05)
Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical Contols Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.14
Observations 1091 1091 1091 1091 1091 1085 1085 1085
Notes: Standardized coefficients from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. Heteroskedasticity robust stan-
dard error estimates clustered at the department level are reported in parentheses; *** denotes statistical signif-
icance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table B.4. Ecological Diversity and Landholding Inequality - Historical Variables - Instru-
mental Variable Regression
Landholding Inequality (Gini, 2005)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ecological Diversity 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.41*** 0.42***
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Presence of Spaniards 0.04 0.04
(0.03) (0.03)
Presence of Natives -0.01 -0.03
(0.03) (0.03)
Presence of Slaves 0.05* 0.05*
(0.03) (0.03)
Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical Contols Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical Controls Non Immediate Neighbors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Observations 1089 1089 1089 1089
Underidentification 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weak Identification 61.685 61.831 61.425 60.775
Notes: Standardized coefficients from Instrumental Variable (IV) regression. Heteroskedasticity
robust standard error estimates clustered at the department level are reported in parentheses; ***
denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level, all
for two-sided hypothesis tests. Underidentification Test reports the p-value for the Kleibergen-
Paap (2006) rk statistic with rejection implying identification; F-stat reports the Kleibergen-Paap
F statistic and Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic for weak identification.
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Table B.5. Ecodiversity and Conflict XIX - Historical Variables
Conflict XIX
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ecological Diversity 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.32** 0.31** 0.26** 0.26**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13)
Presence of Spaniards 0.05 -0.00 0.03 -0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Presence of Natives 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Presence of Slaves 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.39*** 0.39***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical Contols Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical Controls Non Immediate Neighbors No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 0.03 0.03 0.18 0.18 -0.03 -0.02 0.13 0.13
Observations 1122 1122 1122 1122 1119 1119 1119 1119
Underidentification 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weak Identification 62.932 63.190 62.717 62.141
Notes: Standardized coefficients from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Instrumental Variable (IV) regressions.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard error estimates clustered at the department level are reported in parentheses;
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level, all for two-sided
hypothesis tests. Underidentification Test reports the p-value for the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk statistic with rejection
implying identification; F-stat reports the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic and Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic for weak
identification.
Table B.6. Ecodiversity and Conflict Before 1850 - Historical Variables
Occurrence of Battles Before 1850
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ecological Diversity 0.08** 0.07** 0.04 0.03 -0.00 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13)
Presence of Spaniards 0.11** 0.05 0.12*** 0.07
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Presence of Natives 0.11** 0.06 0.13*** 0.08**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Presence of Slaves 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.36*** 0.35***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical Contols Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical Controls Non Immediate Neighbors No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 0.02 0.02 0.13 0.13 -0.01 -0.00 0.10 0.10
Observations 1122 1122 1122 1122 1119 1119 1119 1119
Underidentification 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weak Identification 62.932 63.190 62.717 62.141
Notes: Standardized coefficients from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Instrumental Variable (IV) regressions.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard error estimates clustered at the department level are reported in parentheses;
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level, all for two-sided
hypothesis tests. Underidentification Test reports the p-value for the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk statistic with rejection
implying identification; F-stat reports the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic and Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic for weak
identification.
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Table B.7. Ecodiversity and Conflict After 1850 - Historical Variables
Occurrence of Battles After 1850
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ecological Diversity 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.30** 0.29** 0.25* 0.24*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13)
Presence of Spaniards 0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Presence of Natives 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Presence of Slaves 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.34*** 0.34***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical Contols Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical Controls Non Immediate Neighbors No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted-R2 0.03 0.03 0.14 0.14 -0.02 -0.02 0.10 0.10
Observations 1122 1122 1122 1122 1119 1119 1119 1119
Underidentification 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weak Identification 62.932 63.190 62.717 62.141
Notes: Standardized coefficients from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Instrumental Variable (IV) regressions.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard error estimates clustered at the department level are reported in parentheses;
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level, all for two-sided
hypothesis tests. Underidentification Test reports the p-value for the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk statistic with rejection





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: CAUSAL RELATIONS
WITHIN NAFTA
Data
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Time Series Model
The general model is
zt = A0 +
p∑
i=1
Aizt−i + ”t. (C.1)
After defining the order of the VAR, we performed a Johansen’s test in order to check if
there are cointegrating vectors.
In general, for vector zt of variables {lyt, lxt, lmt} we express model (C.1)
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zt = A0 + æzt +
p−1∑
i=1
 i∆zt−i + ”t,
where p is defined previously, æ =
∑p
i=1 Ai and  i = −
∑p
j=i+1 Aj, for i = 1, . . . , p−1. Now,
subtracting zt−1 from both sides, we obtain
∆zt = A0 +  zt−1 +
p−1∑
i=1
 i∆zt−i + ”t,
where  0 = −(I − ρ). If there are cointegration, we have
∆zt = A0 −BAzt−1 +
p−1∑
i=1
 i∆zt−i + ”t, (C.2)
where A is a h× 3 matrix of cointegrating vectors, Azt−1 is a h× 1 vector of I(0) variables,
B is a 3 × h matrix such that BA = I −
∑p
i=1 Ai and h is the rank of A and shows the
number of cointegrating relations. Model (C.2) is the Error Correction Model and can be
estimated by OLS since all variables are I(0)1.
1After defining the number of lags, we performed a Johansen’s test in order to check if there are cointe-
grating vectors. In general, for vector z of variables {ly, lx, lm} we run the model
zt = A1zt−1 +A2zt−2 + ”t
which is the VAR representation. Subtracting zt−1 from both sides, we obtain
zt − zt−1 = A1zt−1 − zt−1 +A2zt−1 −A2zt−1 +A2zt−2 + ”t
∆zt = (A1 +A2 − I)zt−1 −A2∆zt−1 + ”t
and it is possible to decomposed A1 +A2 − 1 in the 3× 3 matrix αβ
′








∆zt = αγt−1 −A2∆zt−1 + ”t
which is the Error Correction Model for a second order VAR.
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Results in a one-country basis
Mexico
Following the procedure described in methodology, we first check the dynamic conditions
of the series for each country (The results are presented in Table C.1). According to the
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test results, if trend and constant are included, ly has not
unit root. However, if either an intercept (µ 6= 0) or none of deterministic terms (µ, β = 0),
the logarithm of GDP exhibits a dynamic behavior with unit root. If the test is run in
differences, the null hypothesis if the existence of unit root is rejected in all specifications.
If instead of ADF test it is ran the Phillips-Perron (PP) test, something similar happens.
The null hypothesis is not rejected if an intercept is included (p = 0.0052), but it is rejected
in the other two specifications. If the variable is the growth rate of GDP, the null hypothesis
is rejected in all specifications. We conclude that ly is I(1).
If the variable is exports, lx, both tests result in not rejection of the null hypothesis.
According to both ADF and PP tests, the logarithm of total exports shows unit root in
levels but it is stationary in first difference. As the logarithm of GDP, the logarithm of
exports is I(1).
Finally, the logarithm of imports, lm, is also I(1), since the null hypothesis is not rejected
when both tests are run at levels and is rejected when the variable is transformed to first
difference. This is true for all specifications.
As it is shown, all series are I(1) in levels, although production (ly) looks stationary in
levels when it is included only an intercept. However, when intercept and trend are included
(µ, β 6= 0) or neither intercept nor trend are included (µ, β = 0), the null hypothesis is not
rejected. Then, we will work with ly as a I(1) series, since in difference there is not any
doubt about the first difference being stationary.
Now we report the analysis of unit roots in panel using GDP, exports and imports. The
null hypothesis is not rejected in levels, but rejected in first differences, according to the
results reported in Table C.2.
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Table C.1. Unit Root Tests for Mexico (Probability)
ADF Test Phillips-Perron Test
µ, β 6= 0 µ 6= 0, β = 0 µ, β = 0 µ, β 6= 0 µ 6= 0, β = 0 µ, β = 0
Level
ly 0.7628 [0] 0.0027 [0] 0.9996 [1] 0.7640 0.0052 1.0000
lx 0.9174 [0] 0.5963 [0] 1.000 [0] 0.8933 0.5369 1.0000
lm 0.1367 [1] 0.9260 [0] 0.9989 [0] 0.2036 0.9527 1.0000
First difference
∆ly 0.0001 [0] 0.0003 [0] 0.0052 [0] 0.0001 0.0003 0.0085
∆lx 0.0001 [0] 0.0000 [0] 0.0008 [0] 0.0000 0.0000 0.0011
∆lm 0.0001 [0] 0.0000 [0] 0.0000 [0] 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Ho : Series has unit root. The number in brackets is the optimal p selected by SIC.
Following the procedure explained, we run different VAR models in order to explore
which one is the number of lags more appropriate for the variables of Mexico. If we include,
for instance, 4 lags and then use the Wald test to check the statistical significance, we found
that one lag is the best dynamic model for this set of data. We obtained the same result
checking the SIC. Since one is the number of lags included in the VAR, we will have a VEC
model without lags. However, we later run a VAR of order 2 in order to test if a VEC model
with one lag describes the behavior of GDP, total exports and imports for Mexican economy.
Now we check if there are cointegrating relations among variables. Since we do not know a
priori the mathematical representation of cointegrating equations, we run a general Johansen
cointegration test and decide the appropriate representation using the SIC and critical values
constructed by Osterwald-Lenum (1992). According to this criterion, the number of cointe-
grating equations is one, the level data zt have linear trends and the cointegrating equation
has only intercept. The cointegration test results are presented in Table C.3.
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Table C.2. Panel Unit Root Test for Mexico (Probability)
Individual Intercept Individual Intercept and Trend Level
Level
Im, Pesaram and Shin (IPS) 0.2430 0.7081
Variable
ly 0.0027 [0] 0.7628 [0]
lx 0.5963 [0] 0.9174 [0]
lm 0.9260 [0] 0.1367 [1]
First Difference
Im, Pesaram and Shin (IPS) 0.0000 0.0000
ly 0.0003 [0] 0.0001 [0]
lx 0.0000 [0] 0.0000 [0]
lm 0.0000 [0] 0.0000 [0]
Note: The number in brackets is the optimal p selected by SIC.
After determining the number of cointegration equation, we run a vector error correction
model (VEC). The equation is represented as following:
Azt−1 = 6.95 + lyt−1 − 7.01lxt−1 + 5.17lmt−1 (C.3)
Results presented in equation (C.3) show that exports are positively related to production
and imports negatively. According with this result, it seems that for Mexico, exports are
negatively related to production while imports are positively related to production. Even
though this relation can be thought as a “macroeconomic identity result”, it is surprising not
having a positive relation between production and imports since emerging economies tend
to import capital goods and technology, key for production and long run development.
The VEC model can be represented as follows:
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Table C.3. Cointegration Test of Mexican Data
H0 : Rank=r Eigenvalue Trace statistic 0.05 Critical value 0.01 Critical value
None(∗∗) 0.605190 58.09033 29.68 35.65
At most 1 0.111687 8.834758 15.41 20.04
At most 2 0.047116 2.557916 3.76 6.65
None(∗∗) 0.605190 49.25557 20.97 25.52
At most 1 0.111687 6.276842 14.07 18.63
At most 2 0.047116 2.412136 3.76 6.65
Trace and Max-Eigen tests indicates 1 cointegrating equation at both 5% and 1% levels.
∗ (∗∗) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) level. Osterwald-Lenum critical values.
∆lyt = ρ1 + αlyγt−1 + ε1t (C.4)
∆lxt = ρ2 + αlxγt−1 + ε2t (C.5)
∆lmt = ρ3 + αlmγt−1 + ε3t (C.6)
where γt−1 is the error correction term and it was not included a lag terms for the three
endogenous variables.
With this system, it is not possible to evaluate short run causality, since the result from
the VAR analysis resulted in one lag and in the setting up of the cointegration model that
lag disappears. At this point we only may test for long run causality, testing if αly = 0,
αlx = 0 and αlm = 0 separately. Since the variables are cointegrated (I(1)) and γt−1) is
stationary by construction, we may use a standard t-test. We find that αly is significant at
1% and αlm at 10%, whereas αlx is not significant. This is evidence of long run causality of
right hand side variables to economic growth and imports. However, the exact direction of
the causality is not revealed.
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Regarding Granger causality in this context, with non-stationary data, we follow Toda
and Yamamoto (1995). In this case, we have reasonable evidence of Granger causality in all
possible directions for all variables.
In order to evaluate short run causality, we also run a second order VAR (as a second
best model) as its correspondent VEC model would have one lag. Its representation is as
follows
∆lyt = ρ1 + αlyγt−1 + β11∆lyt−1 + β12∆lxt−1 + β13∆lmt−1 + ε1t (C.7)
∆lxt = ρ1 + αlxγt−1 + β21∆lyt−1 + β22∆lxt−1 + β23∆lmt−1 + ε2t (C.8)
∆lmt = ρ1 + αlmγt−1 + β31∆lyt−1 + β32∆lxt−1 + β33∆lmt−1 + ε3t (C.9)
The data modeled with a VAR(2) is still stable and does not have problems of autocor-
relation.
According to SIC, there is only one cointegrating equation with neither intercept nor
trend. If we estimate this VEC model, we obtain that both αly and αlx are statistically
different than zero.
The second test we perform is the short-run causality. For equation (C.7), this test
evaluates if β12 = 0 and separately if β13 = 0, which implies that exports do not affect
economic growth and imports do not affect economic growth, respectively. In this case, β12
is significative at 10%. We also find that imports (β13) are not significative. In the same
way, we find that the neither economic growth nor imports affect exports. Finally, neither
β31 nor β33 are significant separately. At this point we cannot say anything conclusive about
causality though.
The last test might be called strong causality as it is evaluated if, for instance in equation
(C.7), both αly and β12 are jointly significant and αly and β13. These two separate tests will
allow us to conclude Granger causality. In equation (C.7), two hypothesis are rejected, so
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both exports and imports, separately, cause economic growth in Granger sense. Similar
conclusions might be say for the growth rate of exports, equation (C.8). Both economic
growth and imports, separately, Granger cause exports. Finally, in imports equation neither
economic growth nor exports, separately, Granger cause imports.
Following Toda and Yamamoto (1995), we find that causality goes in all directions, which
in some sense is a validation of results described before.
According to traditional literature where the results are based on one-country analysis
and without discriminate specific trade, there is evidence to conclude that for Mexico both
hypotheses hold, that is both exports-led growth and growth-driven exports are satisfied
whereas neither exports-led imports nor growth-driven imports are not. In this sense, for
Mexican economy exports have payed a more important role in development than imports,
when it is expected that for an emerging economy imports play a key role as they should
be composed by capital goods and by this way enhancing the technological transmission
process.
Canada
We present first the results regarding the dynamic characteristics of the individual series.
As it is shown in Table C.4, we have that for specification with only constant, both logarithm
of GDP and exports exhibit stationarity (at 1% and at 5%, respectively) no matter the test
run. When a Phillips-Perron test is performed for the three variables, the null hypothesis
of existence of unit root is rejected. If the two tests are run in differences, we may conclude
that the rate of growth of those variables is stationary. We conclude that the three variables
are I(1).
When the unit root test is run in levels taking into account panel data, there are some
doubts when the specification is only with intercept. However, when we use first differences
of the variables, both specifications allow us to conclude that the panel of data is stationary
when we use the rate of growth of the variables. The results are shown in Table C.4. We
conclude that the three variables are I(1).
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Table C.4. Unit Root Tests for Canada (Probability)
ADF Test Phillips-Perron Test
µ, β 6= 0 µ 6= 0, β = 0 µ, β = 0 µ, β 6= 0 µ 6= 0, β = 0 µ, β = 0
Level
ly 0.2743 [1] 0.0011 [0] 0.9998 [1] 0.5945 0.0040 1.0000
lx 0.9822 [0] 0.0411 [0] 0.9993 [1] 0.9822 0.0411 1.0000
lm 0.7509 [0] 0.3624 [0] 1.0000 [0] 0.8967 0.0072 1.0000
First difference
∆ly 0.0001 [0] 0.0003 [0] 0.0052 [0] 0.0001 0.0003 0.0085
∆lx 0.0001 [0] 0.0005 [0] 0.0220 [0] 0.0001 0.0006 0.0501
∆lm 0.0001 [0] 0.0000 [0] 0.0000 [0] 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Ho : Series has unit root. The number in brackets is the optimal p selected by SIC.
Once we define the order of integration, we proceed with the definition of lags. When we
run a fourth order VAR, the appropriate number of lags to be included is 2. With p = 2,
the model does not exhibit autocorrelation problem.
With that specification in the VAR, we run a cointegration test. As in Mexican case, we
run first a general test, in order to test and check the best functional form of the cointegrating
equation, if it exists. Once we find that the best functional form of the error correction term
is with intercept but no trend, we run a Johansen’s test which indicates that there are no
cointegrating relations among the three variables. This conclusion is opposite to that from
Zestos and Tao (2002), where they defined that there is one cointegrating equation with
intercept.
With our sample of Canadian data, we do not find any long run relation among the
three variables used in this paper. Then, we run a first order VAR model in first differences
in order to analyze the dynamic relations among Canada’s production, total exports and
imports. We conclude that we can reject the hypothesis of no causality from exports and
imports to production while we cannot reject the null hypothesis neither from production
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Table C.5. Panel Unit Root Test for Canada (Probability)
Individual Intercept Individual Intercept and Trend Level
Level
Im, Pesaram and Shin (IPS) 0.0012 0.9006
Variable
ly 0.0011 [0] 0.2743 [1]
lx 0.0411 [0] 0.9822 [0]
lm 0.3624 [0] 0.7509 [0]
First Difference
Im, Pesaram and Shin (IPS) 0.0000 0.0000
ly 0.0005 [0] 0.0001 [0]
lx 0.0001 [0] 0.0001 [0]
lm 0.0000 [0] 0.0000 [0]
Note: The number in brackets is the optimal p selected by SIC.
and imports to exports nor from production and exports to imports. In this sense, we may
say, as Zestos and Tao (2002), that Canadian economy is more trade dependent and an open
economy since its external sector influences significantly its production. If it is performed a
generalized impulse-response exercise, we observe that there are strong interrelations among
variables, although the variables adjust rapidly after two or three periods.
United States
Finally we analyze the characteristics of US production, total exports and imports. Tak-
ing the variables individually, we observe that in general they are I(1). As in the previous
cases, the level of logarithm of GDP exhibits stationarity in one of the three specifications.
However, the growth rate of production is stationary in all specifications (Table C.7).
A similar conclusion is obtained when we perform a panel unit root test. As it is showed
in Table C.6, the variables in levels exhibit a unit root, since it cannot be rejected the null
hypothesis of existence of a unit root. However, when the variables are expressed in first
differences, the panel is stationary, according to Im-Pesaram-Shin test. We may conclude
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that variables are I(1) and this is a reason to check cointegration, since any VAR model run
with variables in first differences would have an omitted variable bias.
The first step is check for the number of lags to include in the VAR and, if proceeds, in
the VEC model. According to the all criteria evaluated in E-views, the optimal number of
p is 2. In this sense, if the variables are cointegrated, the VEC model should have p=1.
Table C.6. Panel Unit Root Test for US (Probability)
Individual Intercept Individual Intercept and Trend Level
Level
Im, Pesaram and Shin (IPS) 0.4964 0.4653
Variable
ly 0.0768 [0] 0.3349 [1]
lx 0.8186 [0] 0.3170 [1]
lm 0.7126 [0] 0.7588 [0]
First Difference
Im, Pesaram and Shin (IPS) 0.0000 0.0000
ly 0.0001 [0] 0.0002 [0]
lx 0.0000 [0] 0.0000 [0]
lm 0.0000 [0] 0.0000 [0]
Note: The number in brackets is the optimal p selected by SIC.
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Table C.7. Unit Root Tests for US (Probability)
ADF Test Phillips-Perron Test
µ, β 6= 0 µ 6= 0, β = 0 µ, β = 0 µ, β 6= 0 µ 6= 0, β = 0 µ, β = 0
Level
ly 0.3349 [1] 0.0768 [0] 1.0000 [0] 0.8032 0.0632 1.0000
lx 0.3170 [1] 0.8186 [0] 1.0000 [0] 0.5232 0.8212 1.0000
lm 0.7558 [0] 0.7126 [0] 1.0000 [0] 0.6365 0.7124 1.0000
First difference
∆ly 0.0002 [0] 0.0001 [0] 0.0138 [0] 0.0003 0.0002 0.0295
∆lx 0.0001 [0] 0.0000 [0] 0.0013 [0] 0.0001 0.0000 0.0018
∆lm 0.0000 [0] 0.0000 [0] 0.0002 [0] 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002
Ho : Series has unit root. The number in brackets is the optimal p selected by SIC.
Table C.8. Cointegration Test of US Data
H0 : Rank=r Eigenvalue Trace statistic 0.05 Critical value 0.01 Critical value
None(∗∗) 0.283255 30.70473 29.68 35.65
At most 1 0.198615 13.38688 15.41 20.04
At most 2 0.035385 1.873374 3.76 6.65
None(∗∗) 0.283255 17.31785 20.97 25.52
At most 1 0.198615 11.51350 14.07 18.63
At most 2 0.035385 1.873374 3.76 6.65
Trace and Max-Eigen tests indicates 1 cointegrating equation at both 5% and 1% levels.
∗ (∗∗) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) level. Osterwald-Lenum critical values.
A second order VAR for US data does not have autocorrelation problem and satisfies
stability condition since no root lies outside of unit circle.
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When we run a general cointegration test, we obtained that data should exhibit linear
trend and the cointegrating equation has intercept but no trend. Running a Johansen’s test
with those characteristics, we find that there is one cointegrating equation according to trace
statistic, but none with max-eigenvalue statistic, as it shows Table C.6.
We decide to work with one cointegrating relation with intercept (as it is ran in Zestos
and Tao, 2002). Doing this, the cointegrating equation is as follows
Azt−1 = −9.43 + lyt−1 − 0.40lxt−1 − 0.09lmt−1
As it can be observed, both total exports and imports have a positive relation with GDP.
As in Mexican case, we use two models represented by equations (C.4)-(C.6) and (C.7)-(C.9).
It is important to mention that the error correction term is statistically significant only in
first difference of the growth rate of production.
Regarding Granger causality, following Toda and Yamamoto (1995) methodology, that is,
evaluate in a VAR model in levels, instead of using the VEC model, we find that marginally at
5% and at 1%, we may conclude that production and imports cause exports and production
and exports cause imports while we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no causality from
exports and imports to production.
Results by Sub Blocs
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where p is the optimal number of lags, and αwnk’s are the coefficient for each variable in the
right hand side and w = [yi, yj, xij, xji], n = [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] and ECT is the error correction
term. The first test might be called the long run causality and tests the significance of αw5 in
each equation. The short run test evaluates the impact of variables individually considered
and the Granger causality test evaluates the significance of both error correction term and
all variables individually considered2.
Canada and Mexico
We first analyze Canada and Mexico as a subgroup. In Appendix C the results are
reported country by country. We may add only that both exports from Mexico to Canada
and Canada to Mexico seem to have unit root individually considered. If it is ran a panel
unit root, we may confirm that the series are I(1), as Table C.9 shows, so it is necessary to
check cointegration.
After we run a fourth order VAR for this group, we pick 1 as the appropriate number of
lags to include in the model. However the model has serial correlation. We need to add two
more lags in order to solve it. A third order VAR satisfies stability and not having serial
correlation.
Now we run a cointegration test. According to SIC, we should choose a model where
cointegrating equations include intercept and without a trend in the data. Since this is
atypical, we will run a model with linear trend for data. According to Table 10, we would
have only one cointegrating equation.
The cointegrating equation is:
Azt−1 = −7.13 + lycant−1 − 0.39lymext−1 − 0.13lxcanmext−1 − 0.03lxmexcant−1
There is a positive long-run relation between all variables. In the estimated VEC model,
the coefficient for the error correction term is significant in equation for Canadian GDP (at
1%), Mexican GDP (at 10%) and exports from Canada to Mexico (at 1%).
2For instance if we want to test export led growth hypothesis for Canadian GDP for the sub bloc Canada-
Mexico, the null jointly hypothesis is H0 : α
ycan







Regarding short run causality, we may say the following. In equation for Canadian
GDP, only imports from Mexico are statistically significant at 5%. The other two variables
(Mexican GDP and export to Mexico) are not significant as in equation for Mexican GDP.
This implies that exports from Mexico to Canada have a significant impact on both GDPs. If
we test the second hypothesis, we may say that none of the variables in equation for exports
from Canada to Mexico is significant. Finally, in the equation for exports from Mexico to
Canada, Canadian GDP (at 1%), Mexican GDP (at 5%) and imports from Canada (at 1%)
are significant.
Besides regarding the variables individually considered, regarding short run causality
there is evidence to conclude that only imports from Mexico are statistically significant,
only in the equation for Canadian GDP. Moreover, the exogenous variable is not significant
which indicates that the preferential trade agreement has not been important for the sample
we have used. It is true that the share of exports between Mexico and Canada has increased,
but its role has not been significant.
The third test is the jointly hypothesis gathering long- and short-run effects. For Cana-
dian GDP equation the three joint hypothesis are rejected. Regarding Mexican GDP, Cana-
dian GDP is not significant, but both exports to and imports from Mexico (at 10%) are
significant. With respect the last two variables (exports from Mexico to Canada and from
Canada to Mexico) the three variables are significant, exhibiting evidence on favor of growth-
driven exports hypotheses.
Regarding Granger causality test, we again use Toda and Yamamoto (1995) methodology.
According to this test on VAR version of the model, including fourth lag as exogenous
variable, we can reject the null hypothesis of no causality from Mexican and Canadian
exports and Canadian GDP to Mexican GDP at 5% of significance and from Canadian and
Mexican GDP and exports from Canada to Mexico to exports from Mexico to Canada at
10%. This means that there is evidence to ensure that Mexico has been benefited of trade
with Canada but not the opposite.
In conclusion, the cross validation from cointegration analysis and Toda and Yamamoto
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(1995) methodology provide evidence for the growth-driven exports for Mexico and marginally
for Canada. So in this sub bloc the agreement has been beneficial for trade but not neces-
sarily for production.
Canada and United States
Now we study Canada and United States sub-group. If specific exports series are analyzed
individually, we may conclude that they are I(1). The same applies when a panel unit root
test is run for the set of variables as it is shown in Table C.11.
We run a VAR model and then check the optimal number of lags. In this sub-group 2
is the appropriate number of lags to include. This second order VAR model satisfies both
stability conditions as serial autocorrelation.
We now proceed with the cointegration test. The general test indicates that the data
trend should be worked with linear trend and the cointegrating equation should have only
intercept. If a Johansen’s test is run, we may conclude that within this sub-group there is
no evidence of long run relations among the variables included.
As the interest is Granger causality, we run the VAR model in levels following Toda and
Yamamoto (1995). In this case, we find evidence to conclude that among these economies
trade is important for production, although the Granger causality test for US GDP shows
that exports to and imports from Canada as wells as Canadian GDP are significant (at 5%).
This is not true for Canadian GDP3.
Mexico and United States
We need to check first the dynamic characteristics of series in the group. As it is observed
from Table C.13, the variables are I(1) as there is evidence of existence of unit root.
Once we define the order of integration, we run a VAR model in order to analyze the
optimal number of lags. Despite the order recommended is one, this VAR model has serial
correlation problem. Adding an additional lag, we solve autocorrelation problem and the
model satisfies stability condition.
3If we run the VAR model in first differences, we find that the export-led growth hypothesis does not
hold whereas the growth-driven exports hypothesis hold. At the end, we do not find conclusive evidence for
the last one but for the export-led growth hypothesis.
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We run then, first, a general cointegration test where we find that the data exhibits
linear trend and the cointegrating equation has an intercept. Lastly, Johansen’s test suggests
existence of 2 cointegrating equations at 5% and only one at 1% (Table C.14).
We estimate the VEC model with two cointegrating equations. The cointegrating equa-
tions are:
A1z1,t−1 = −7.87 + lymext−1 − 2.06lxmexust−1 + 1.56lxusmext−1
A2z2,t−1 = −14.92 + lyust−1 + 1.65lxmexust−1 − 1.77lxusmext−1
According to the results, the first error correction term is significant in 4 equations but
the second one is statistically significant only in equations for both Mexican and US GDP.
Any deviation of long run relation one will affect negatively to US economy and negatively
to Mexican GDP, but positively to exports from Mexico to US.
Regarding the second long run relation, any deviation on it will impact negatively both
Mexican and US growth rate of production.
Now we proceed with the analysis of short run causality. For Mexican GDP equation
we do not find any variable significative (US GDP, exports from Mexico to US and exports
from US to Mexico). Something similar happens in US GDP; Mexican GDP and bilateral
trade are not statistically significant. In the exports from Mexico to US equation, the only
significant variable is exports from US to Mexico; its impact is negative. Lastly in exports
from US to Mexico equation, none variable is significant.
Finally, we analyze Granger causality taking in consideration not only short run coef-
ficients but also long run ones. We find evidence to conclude that Mexican GDP and US
GDP are Granger caused by bilateral trade at 5% of significance. Moreover, exports from
Mexico to US are Granger caused by exports from US to Mexico whereas exports from US
to Mexico are Granger separately caused by Mexican and US GDP as wells as by exports
from Mexico to US.
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If we follow Toda and Yamamoto (1995) methodology to analyze Granger causality, we
find that exports in both countries are Granger caused by the other three variables, while
US GDP is Granger caused for the other variables at marginally 10%. However, this is
counterintuitive, since US does not exhibit a higher dependency of trade4.
In conclusion, there is evidence to conclude that in this sub bloc exports from Mexico
and from US have been enhanced with specific trade and production and US production
with trade, whereas we have not found a significant impact of US GDP and bilateral trade
on Mexican GDP.
Table C.9. Panel Unit Root Test for Canada-Mexico (Probability)
Individual Intercept Individual Intercept and Trend Level
Level
Im, Pesaram and Shin (IPS) 0.0206 0.1055
Variable
lycan 0.0011 [0] 0.2743 [1]
lymex 0.0027 [0] 0.7628 [0]
lxcanmex 0.9139 [0] 0.3585 [0]
lxmexcan 0.7500 [0] 0.0143 [0]
First Difference
Im, Pesaram and Shin (IPS) 0.0000 0.0000
lycan 0.0005 [0] 0.0001 [0]
lymex 0.0003 [0] 0.0001 [0]
lxcanmex 0.0000 [0] 0.0000[0]
lxmexcan 0.0000 [0] 0.0000 [0]
Note: The number in brackets is the optimal p selected by SIC.
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Table C.10. Cointegration Test of Canada-Mexico
H0 : Rank=r Eigenvalue Trace statistic 0.05 Critical value 0.01 Critical value
None(∗∗) 0.535467 65.44758 47.21 54.46
At most 1 0.253794 27.11147 29.68 35.65
At most 2 0.203498 12.47378 15.41 20.04
At most 3 0.021711 1.097498 3.76 6.65
None(∗∗) 0.535467 38.33611 27.07 32.24
At most 1 0.253794 14.63769 20.97 25.52
At most 2 0.203498 11.37628 14.07 18.63
At most 3 0.021711 1.097498 3.76 6.65
Trace and Max-Eigen tests indicate 1 cointegrating equation at both 5% and 1% levels.
∗ (∗∗) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) level. Osterwald-Lenum critical values.
4Zestos and Tao (2002) concludes that US is an economy less dependent on trade than Canada.
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Table C.11. Panel Unit Root Test for Canada-US (Probability)
Individual Intercept Individual Intercept and Trend Level
Level
Im, Pesaram and Shin (IPS) 0.0062 0.7653
Variable
lycan 0.0011 [0] 0.2743 [1]
lymex 0.0768 [0] 0.3349 [1]
lxcanmex 0.2635 [1] 0.9103 [1]
lxmexcan 0.5877 [0] 0.8767 [0]
First Difference
Im, Pesaram and Shin (IPS) 0.0000 0.0000
lycan 0.0005 [0] 0.0001 [0]
lymex 0.0001 [0] 0.0002 [0]
lxcanmex 0.0007 [0] 0.0010 [0]
lxmexcan 0.0000 [0] 0.0000 [0]
Note: The number in brackets is the optimal p selected by SIC.
Table C.12. Cointegration Test of Canada-US
H0 : Rank=r Eigenvalue Trace statistic 0.05 Critical value 0.01 Critical value
None 0.355462 38.45888 47.21 54.46
At most 1 0.192641 16.05855 29.68 35.65
At most 2 0.068707 5.145251 15.41 20.04
At most 3 0.021711 1.097498 3.76 6.65
None 0.355462 22.40032 27.07 32.24
At most 1 0.192641 10.91330 20.97 25.52
At most 2 0.068707 3.630244 14.07 18.63
At most 3 0.029269 1.515007 3.76 6.65
Trace and Max-Eigen tests indicate no cointegration at both 5% and 1% levels.
∗ (∗∗) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) level. Osterwald-Lenum critical values.
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Table C.13. Panel Unit Root Test for Mexico-US (Probability)
Individual Intercept Individual Intercept and Trend Level
Level
Im, Pesaram and Shin (IPS) 0.1174 0.6305
Variable
lymex 0.0027 [0] 0.7628 [0]
lyus 0.0768 [0] 0.3349 [1]
lxmexus 0.6922 [0] 0.9551 [0]
lxusmex 0.9212 [0] 0.0932 [1]
First Difference
Im, Pesaram and Shin (IPS) 0.0000 0.0000
lymex 0.0003 [0] 0.0001 [0]
lyus 0.0001 [0] 0.0002 [0]
lxmexus 0.0000 [0] 0.0000[0]
lxusmex 0.0000 [1] 0.0000 [1]
Note: The number in brackets is the optimal p selected by SIC.
Table C.14. Cointegration Test of Mexico-US
H0 : Rank=r Eigenvalue Trace statistic 0.05 Critical value 0.01 Critical value
None(∗∗) 0.466051 67.65962 47.21 54.46
At most 1(∗) 0.345941 35.03198 29.68 35.65
At most 2 0.163014 12.95497 15.41 20.04
At most 3 0.068711 3.701659 3.76 6.65
None(∗∗) 0.466051 32.62765 27.07 32.24
At most 1(∗) 0.345941 22.07701 20.97 25.52
At most 2 0.163014 9.253313 14.07 18.63
At most 3 0.068711 3.701659 3.76 6.65
Trace and Max-Eigen tests indicate 2 cointegrating equation(s) at 5% and 1 at 1%.
∗ (∗∗) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) level. Osterwald-Lenum critical values.
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Galor, O. and Özak, Ö. (2016). The Agricultural Origins of Time Preference. American
Economic Review, 106(10):3064–3103.
Ghartey, E. E. (1993). Causal relationship between exports and economic growth: some
empirical evidence in Taiwan, Japan and the US. Applied Economics, 25(9):1145–1152.
Gibbons, S. and Overman, H. G. (2012). Mostly Pointless Spatial Econometrics? Journal
of Regional Science, 52(2):172–191.
Gibbons, S., Overman, H. G., and Patacchini, E. (2015). Spatial Methods. In Duranton, G.,
Henderson, J. V., and Strange, W., editors, Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics,
volume 5A, pages 115–168. Elsevier.
Giles, J. A. and Williams, C. L. (2000a). Export-led growth: a survey of the empirical liter-
ature and some non-causality results. Part 1. Journal of International Trade & Economic
Development, 9(3):261–337.
Giles, J. A. and Williams, C. L. (2000b). Export-led growth: a survey of the empirical liter-
ature and some non-causality results. Part 2. Journal of International Trade & Economic
Development, 9(4):445–470.
126
Giles, J. A. and Williams, C. L. (2000c). Export-led growth: a survey of the empirical liter-
ature and some non-causality results. Part 2. Journal of International Trade & Economic
Development, 9(4):445–470.
Giraldo, A. and Ojha, M. (2017). An evaluation of the effect of quality of education on
violence: Evidence from colombia. Unpublished.
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Econòmica (CSIC).
Sultan, R. (2012). An econometric study of economic growth, energy and exports in Mauri-
tius: Implications for trade and climate policy. International Journal of Energy Economics
and Policy, 2(4):225–237.
Swee, E. L. et al. (2009). On war and schooling attainment: The case of Bosnia and Herze-
govina. Technical report, Households in Conflict Network.
134
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